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ARGUMENT1 
L THE JENSENS HAVE FAILED TO ARTICULATE RIGHTS 
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION THAT ARE BROADER 
THAN THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. 
In response to the Court's order for supplemental briefing, the Jensens have 
described six rights under the Utah Constitution.2 The Jensens fail, however, to provide 
cases, statutes, or historical evidence establishing these rights, or expanding their scope 
beyond U.S. constitutional protections. Moreover, two federal courts, after carefully 
scrutinizing the evidence, found that Drs. Wagner and Albritton did not violate the rights 
the Jensens assert. 
A. The Right to Direct Medical Care. 
The Jensens assert the right to direct medical care unless government action is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The Jensens cite no cases 
establishing this right under the Utah Constitution. Nor do they cite any cases making 
this right broader under the Utah Constitution than it is under the U.S. Constitution. 
Instead, they cite a general description of Art. I, § 7 from In Re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 
(Utah 1982). But In Re J.P. is not a medical neglect case and it does not distinguish 
1
 Appellees Wagner and Albritton incorporate the argument set forth by Appellees 
Eisenman, Cunningham and Anderson in their supplemental brief. 
included in the rights asserted by the Jensens is the right to an investigation prior 
to commencing removal proceedings. This right concerns the actions of defendants 
Eisenman, Cunningham and Anderson, and the defendant doctors incorporate these 
Defendants' arguments with regard to this asserted constitutional right. 
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between substantive due process rights under the Utah and U.S. Constitutions. In Re J.P., 
648 P.2d at 1372-78. In fact, In Re IP. does not differentiate between the familial 
association rights under the U.S. and Utah constitutions. 
The Jensens also cite Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 
2003), to support their right to direct medical care under the Utah Constitution. Dubbs 
does not involve substantive due process or Utah law, as it arose in Oklahoma. The 
Dubbs court discussed, but did not establish, the contours of a parent's right to direct 
medical care under the U.S. Constitution. Rather, the court held that the physical 
examinations of pre-school children were searches subject to Fourth Amendment 
requirements. 
Surprisingly, the Jensens fail to cite the Tenth Circuit's opinion in the present case, 
which folly discusses the right to direct medical care under the U.S. Constitution. The 
Tenth Circuit concluded, "the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care in this case — if 
any right indeed exists in such circumstances — was not clearly established at the time 
the Jensens allege the right was violated." Jensen v. Wagner, et al, 603 F.3d 1182 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (referred to herein as 'Tenth Cir. Order," at 26, attached as Addendum A). 
The court explained: 
The record demonstrates that no less than seven qualified and competent 
doctors evaluated P.J., diagnosed him with life-threatening cancer, and 
recommended that he immediately undergo chemotherapy treatment in 
order to save his life. In this particular situation, the Jensens did not have a 
clearly established constitutional right to refuse unanimous recommended 
treatment or to solicit additional opinions until they found a doctor who 
-? . 
disagreed that conventional treatment was necessary. Indeed, the Jensens 
had a "'high duty' to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow 
medical advice." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
* # * 
[T]he Jensens do not direct us to a clearly established constitutional line that 
defines what a state can and cannot do to protect a child whose life is 
compromised by his parents' refusal to obtain medical care. Certainly, the 
Jensens do not assert any factual allegation that is substantially supported in 
the record which would constitute state action that is clearly outside the 
state's "wide range of power." Accordingly, under the circumstances of 
this case, the Jensens' asserted right to direct P.J.'s medical care was not 
clearly established at the time of the alleged violations. 
Tenth Cir. Order, at 28-29. 
Contrary to the Jensens' claim, they do not have a clear Utah constitutional 
substantive due process right to direct medical care in the circumstances of this case. This 
claimed right, in fact, is identical to the right provided by the U.S. Constitution. Although 
it is without doubt that parents have a substantive due process right to procreate and raise 
a family, their control over their children's medical treatment is not firm or absolute. This 
is because the child's right to life must be considered whenever a parent asserts a 
contested right to control the child's medical care. Most often the child's interests in these 
circumstances are advocated by the State exercising its parens patriae powers. 
A close examination of the common law prior to the enactment of the Utah 
Constitution, the text of the Constitution, and the Juvenile Court legislation adopted in the 
first 40 years of statehood support the conclusion that the right to direct medical care 
under the United States and Utah constitutions are identical. In William Blackstone's 
Commentary, published in 1765, he wrote: 
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a 
principle of natural law; an obligation says Puffendorf, laid on them not 
only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the 
world; for they would be in the highest manner injurious to their issue, if 
they only gave their children life that they might afterwards see them perish. 
By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation 
to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed 
shall be supported and preserved. And thus the children will have the 
perfect right of receiving maintenance from the parents. 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, § 447 (1765) (emphasis in original). 
Relying on Blackstone, a Missouri court reasoned: 
It follows that society may punish a parent for dereliction in his duties; but 
society is not required to stand aside until a child is dead for want of care, 
but may take direct steps to preserve the life that the parents neglected to 
cherish. 
Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952). 
Eleven years after Blackstone recorded this commentary, the Declaration of 
Independence provided that persons had the inalienable right to live. See DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE, 11 (U.S. 1776). Fifteen years later, in 1791, the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution recognized a citizen's right not to have her "life" deprived 
without due process. Then in 1896 the Utah Constitution recognized the identical right to 
life in Article I ,§§ 1 and 7. This Constitution also created the Legislature and granted it 
the power to enact laws, Art. VI § 1, and to create courts, Art VIII, § 1. Pursuant to this 
authority, the Legislature in 1905 created the Juvenile Courts. See 1905 Utah Laws, c. 
117. Importantly, this act provided that if a child was "neglect[ed]" or in need of "care," 
or "ill treated so as to be in peril of life, [or] health" then the court may take custody of 
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the child, whose disposition would be in accordance with the child's "best interests." See 
1917 Utah Laws, c. 10 § 1836. This basic state power to protect children through the 
Juvenile Courts continued through acts passed in 1931, 1933, 1953, 1996, 1997 and 2003. 
By 1933 the Juvenile Court Act conveyed original jurisdiction over all cases 
relating to "the neglect... of children who are under eighteen years of age." Utah Code 
Ann. § 11-7-5 (1933). Under this statute, neglected children included children "whose 
parent, guardian or custodian neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary . . . 
medical or surgical care or other care necessary for his health, morals, or well-being." 
Id3 This provision has been included in each subsequent revision of the act up to, and 
including, 2003. See U.C.A. § 55-10-6 (1953); U.C.A. § 78-3a-103(q)(I) (1996); U.C.A. 
§ 78-3a-103(s)(i)(D) (2003). "The purpose of the [juvenile] court under this chapter is to: 
. . . (g). . . strive to act in the best interests of the minor's in all cases and attempt to 
preserve and strengthen family ties where possible." U.C.A. § 78-3a-102(5)(g). 
These provisions have never been declared unconstitutional They embody the state's 
common law parens patriae powers to protect children, which by all accounts predates 
the adoption of the constitution. This is strong evidence that a parent's right to control the 
medical care of their children has never been unfettered, and that the state may intervene 
3Similar provisions to protect children from medical neglect were enacted in other 
states at approximately the same time. See N.Y. Child. Ct. Acts. § 4(f) (1922); 11 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 5(c) (1933); and Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.04.10 (1916). 
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if the child's health or life is threatened. See In Re Custody of a Minor, 389 N.E.2d 68 
(Mass. 1979). 
Even if some right to direct medical care was established by the Utah Constitution, 
and required state action to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest, the federal 
district court has already applied this standard to the evidence in this case. It set forth this 
exact standard, stating: "The Jensens claim that Defendants infringed on their right to 
direct PJ. 's medical care and their right to familial association . . . This "fundamental 
right" encompasses both of the liberty interests asserted by the Jensens, calling for 
application of the compelling interest/narrowly tailored standard." P. J. v. Utah, etal, 
2008 WL 4372933 (D. Utah 2008), herein cited to as "R. 117-188," (R. 147), attached as 
Addendum B. After thoroughly reviewing the evidence, "[t]he Court [found] that 
Dr. Wagner's conduct in providing medical care for P J. and referring his case to DCFS 
after the Jensens would not consent to PJ. 's treatment were narrowly tailored to serve the 
State's compelling interest in protecting children." (R. 155.) 
The Jensens have submitted no cases, statutes, or historical evidence of a broader 
right to direct medical care under the Utah Constitution than the U.S. Constitution. 
Therefore, the district court's judgment that this claim is barred by the doctrines of 
res judicata and law of the case should be affirmed. 
-6-
B. The Right to Follow Medical Recommendations of a Licensed 
Physician. 
The Jensens distinguish this right from the right to direct medical care, but provide 
no supporting authority. They provide no cases, statutes or historical evidence establish-
ing this right under either the Utah or U.S. Constitution. Courts have long held that the 
state may discharge "duties of parents or guardians in matters involving the life, health, 
and physical welfare of their children or wards when it appears that the parents or 
guardians, through ignorance, fanaticism, or for arbitrary reasons, have become derelict in 
their duty." In Re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128, 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933); see also In Re 
Custody of a Minor, 389 NJE.2d 68 (Mass. 1979). More importantly, the "comparative 
unfitness" standard the Jensens suggest the Juvenile Courts employed contradicts the 
Juvenile Court: Act, which requires the court uto act in the best interests of the minor's in 
all cases." U-C.A. § 78-3a-102 (5)(g) (2003). 
C. The Right Not to be Reported for Seeking a Confirmatory 
Diagnosis. 
This alleged right, too, is a subset of the right to direct medical care. While the 
Jensens assert a substantive due process right not be subject to Juvenile Court proceed-
ings for seeking a confirmatory diagnosis, this claim was not included in their complaint. 
See Complaint, at Tf 192 (R. 57-58). The time to amend has long passed; so, this claim is 
waived. 
Moreover, this claimed right conflicts with Utah's reporting statute, which requires 
"any person . . . [who] has reason to believe that a child has been subjected to . . . neglect 
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. . . [to] immediately notify the nearest peace officer, law enforcement agency, or office of 
[DCFS]." U.C.A. § 62A-4a-403(l) (2003). The Jensens do not challenge this statute, 
and it does not require a doctor to confirm a diagnosis before reporting a parent's refusal 
to consent. Even if it did, "no less than seven qualified and competent doctors evaluated 
P.J., diagnosed him with life-threatening cancer, and recommended that he immediately 
undergo chemotherapy." Tenth Cir. Order, at 28. Therefore, even if the right exists as 
the Jensens frame it, the evidence demonstrates that the doctors did not violate this right. 
D. The Right To Be Free From Material Misrepresentations or 
Omissions and Unreasonable Searches and Seizures. 
The Jensens have made no effort to distinguish between the protections afforded 
these rights under the Utah and U.S. Constitutions; therefore, they are barred by the 
doctrines of res judicata and law of the case, and summary judgment should be affirmed, 
II. TWO FEDERAL COURTS HAVE FOUND THAT THE 
DEFENDANT DOCTORS DID NOT VIOLATE THE JENSENS9 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Even if the above rights as the Jensens have framed them exist, two federal courts 
have carefully reviewed the evidence and found that they were not violated by Drs. 
Wagner and Albritton. These rulings preclude the Jensens from pursuing these claims in 
state court. 
A. Dr. Wagner 
The Jensens have recited the same claims against Dr. Wagner that have been 
rejected by two federal courts. They first claim Dr. Wagner made misrepresentations or 
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omissions to DCFS, the Juvenile Court (via affidavit), and co-workers regarding Parker's 
diagnosis and treatment. The federal district court found no evidence to support this, 
holding: 
The Jensens correctly contend that the Constitution would not permit 
interference with their substantive due process rights by means of 
intentional misrepresentations to the Juvenile Court. However ... the 
Jensens have simply not submitted evidence from which the Court can 
conclude that Dr. Wagner deliberately misrepresented the events and 
circumstances surrounding PJ's medical care to either the Juvenile Court or 
other involved in PJ's case ... [T]he Jensens are correct that intentional and 
material factual misrepresentations and omissions on the part of Dr. Wagner 
to either DCFS representatives or the Juvenile Court would surely have 
interfered with their associational rights on a much grander scale. 
However, the records simply does not sustain these allegations. 
* * * 
As the Jensens received ample notice and an opportunity to be heard, any 
procedural due process claims against Dr. Wagner must be based on his 
alleged misrepresentations and omissions. However, as set forth above, the 
Jensens have not submitted competent evidence that Dr. Wagner 
deliberately misrepresented or omitted material facts to the Juvenile Court 
or others involved in the case. 
(R. 156, 171.) The Tenth Circuit affirmed this ruling, finding that no less than seven 
qualified doctors confirmed the diagnosis and recommended immediate chemotherapy. 
See Tenth Cir. Order, at 28. Based on this, the Tenth Circuit ruled that "[ajlthough we can 
conceive of circumstances in which false testimony may infect a judicial proceeding to 
the point that the proceeding itself becomes constitutionally deficient, the Jensens have 
not demonstrated that any statements by Dr. Wagner had such a degenerative effect on the 
juvenile court proceedings in this case." Tenth Cir. Order, at 33. 
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The Jensens next argue that Dr. Wagner prevented a pre-referral meeting with 
Dr. Corwin to discuss their chosen physician, Dr. Moore. This argument is without merit 
for three reasons. First, Dr. Moore testified that she was not qualified to diagnose or treat 
pediatric cancer:4 
Q: You're not a pathologist, correct? 
A: No, Fm not. 
* * * 
Q: You are not an oncologist, are you? 
A: I am not. 
Q: You are not a pediatric oncologist, are you? 
A: 1 am not. 
Q: You have not spent your career studying Ewing's sarcoma or any other 
pediatric cancer, have you? 
A: No, I have not. 
* * * 
Q: And have had no pathology training to qualify you as a pathologist, 
correct? 
A: Correct. 
* # # 
Q: Cancer is not your specialty, correct? 
A; I never told [the Jensens] it was. They knew it wasn't. 
Q: Did you feel that you may not have been the best doctor to advise them 
on the intricacies of Ewing's sarcoma? 
A: I did. And they were seeing other doctors. I was not their only 
physician. I was advising as a family practice physician, not as an 
oncologist. 
Q: But you were basing your advice on some of the subtle intricacies of 
Ewing's sarcoma; isn't that correct? 
A: The advice -1 did not give advice in relationship to these. 
4These citations from Dr. Moore's deposition were included in Appellees' Reply in 
Support of Motion to Strike Expert Testimony, filed in U.S. District Court on July 16, 
2008. Appellees have filed a motion to supplement the record to include all federal court 
pleadings relating to this motion. 
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Q: Did you ever tell the Jensens that, look, I'm only a family practice doc, 
I'm not a pathologist, I don't have the expertise to second guess what these 
pathologists have written in their reports? Did you ever tell them anything 
like that? 
A: Not in those words. 
Q: Words to that effect? 
A: I did say I was a family practice doctor and I didn't have the expertise. 
Q: Did you tell them you didn't have the expertise to be able to determine 
whether the pathology results that they had already received were reliable? 
A: Specifically those words and specifically that, no. But it was just a 
general that I am not a specialist and these things are not my specialty. 
See Record Supplement: Deposition of Judith Moore, D.O., pp 31, 48, 105, 108, 119, 
Exhibit "B" to Defendants Wagner's and Albritton's Memorandum In Support of Motion 
to Strike Plaintiffs' Attempts to Rebut Medical Evidence without Expert Testimony. 
Second, the Jensens never informed the Juvenile Court that Dr. Moore was their 
preferred physician. To the contrary, during the July 10, 2003 hearing, the Jensens 
proposed obtaining a second diagnosis and treatment recommendations from Children's 
Hospital of Los Angeles O'CHLA"), not Dr. Moore, and the juvenile court entered an 
order to this effect. [R. 515 (Ex. 33B, pp. 24-28; Ex. 10. pp. 227-228.)] The Jensens 
violated this order and refused to treat P.J. when Dr. Tishler of CHLA confirmed the 
diagnosis of cancer and recommended immediate chemotherapy treatment. [R. 515 (Ex. 
33G,pp. 12-13.)] 
Third, the Jensens were able to voice their concerns to Dr. Corwin, as noted by the 
federal district court. (R. 122.) Dr. Corwin did not agree with their choice to ignore the 
diagnosis and treatment. They sued him in this lawsuit but the federal district court 
granted a motion to dismiss Dr. Corwin. 
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The Jensens next claim that Dr. Wagner interfered with their request for indepen-
dent testing at the Dana Farber institute. The federal district court set forth Dr. Wagner's 
entire correspondence with Dr. Holcomb Grier at Dana Farber, but found "[t]his evidence 
does not rise to the level of a unconstitutional infringement of the Jensens' right to direct 
PJ.'s medical care." (R. 153.) 
Finally, the Jensens allege that Dr. Wagner reported them to DCFS because they 
informed him they were going to go elsewhere to seek confirmation of the diagnosis. The 
federal district court noted that "the Jensens were free, at that point, to take P.J. to another 
facility and another doctor for further testing. Thus, Dr. Wagner's refusal to order further 
testing did not, of itself, violate the Jensens' right to direct PJ.'s medical care free from 
unreasonable state interference." (R. 151-152.) In fact, the Jensens selected two doctors 
of their own choosing outside of Primary Children's Medical Center ("PCMC"): 
(1) Dr. Tishler at CHLA [R. 515 (Ex. 33B, pp. 24-28; Ex. 10, pp. 227-228.)] and 
(2) Dr. Johnston at St. Luke's [R. 515 (Ex. 10, pp. 375-381.)] When both doctors 
confirmed the diagnosis and treatment recommendations of PCMC, the Jensens, however, 
disobeyed court orders and refused to treat Parker. See Tenth Cir. Order, at 13; R. 130. 
The federal district court and Tenth Circuit have reviewed each of Dr. Wagner's 
alleged violations and found no evidence from which a reasonable juror could find a 
constitutional violation. The Jensens have failed to articulate broader constitutional rights 
under the Utah Constitution; therefore, summary judgment should be affirmed. 
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B. Dr. Albritton 
The Jensens argue that Dr. Albritton made misrepresentations to the juvenile court 
to perpetuate proceedings, impose a "comparative fitness" standard on the Jensens, and 
induce medication on Parker. Each of these contentions has been reviewed and rejected 
by two federal courts. 
Dr. Albritton was subpoenaed to testify in the July 28, 2003 hearing as an expert 
witness regarding "the medical care required by P.J. and what doctors and facilities were 
capable of providing it." (R. 142.) In that hearing, the Jensens' chosen physician, 
Dr. Tishler of CHLA, confirmed the diagnosis of Ewing's sarcoma and recommended 
immediate chemotherapy. [R. 515 (Ex. 33C, pp. 24-27, 30-31.)] Dr. Tishler also 
confirmed DL Albritton's testimony that only a pediatric oncologist is qualified to direct 
this treatment. The juvenile court agreed, entering an order to that effect. Id. at 54-55. 
There is no evidence Dr. Albritton imposed a "comparative unfitness" standard on the 
Jensens. As an expert witness, of course, Dr. Albritton could impose nothing upon the 
Jensens. That was the Juvenile Court's sole province. 
Finally, no medication was ever induced on Parker. The Jensens refused to 
consent to chemotherapy, which precipitated the juvenile court proceedings where 
Dr. Albritton was subpoenaed to testify. There is no evidence from which a reasonable 
juror could find Dr. Albritton*s juvenile court testimony violated the Jensens' constitu-
tional rights. Summary judgment dismissing her should be affirmed. 
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III. ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 7 AND 14 ARE SELF-EXECUTING. 
This Court has held that Article I, Section 7 is self-executing. See Spackman v. 
Board of Educ. of Box Elder Co. School Distr., 2000 UT 87, f 10. The doctors do not 
believe that Article I5 § 1 provides any rights in addition to the due process rights afforded 
by § 7, as set forth in their initial brief at pp. 60-62. The Jensens have cited no cases, 
statutes or historical evidence supporting additional rights under § I. However, to the 
extent § 1 provides the same due process rights afforded by § 7, it is self-executing under 
Spacbnan. See Id. The doctors also agree that § 14 is self-executing. Like the Fourth 
Amendment, this provision does not require legislation in order to protect citizens from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
IV. THE JENSENS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PURSUE MONEY 
DAMAGES UNDER SPACKMAN. 
Even i fa provision of the Utah Constitution is self-executing, a plaintiff must 
establish "three elements before he or she may proceed with a private suit for damages," 
See Spackman v. Board ofEduc. of Box Elder Co. School Distr., 2000 UT 87, % 22. 
"First, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a "flagrant" violation of his or her 
constitutional rights." Id., at If 23. "Second, a plaintiff must establish that existing 
remedies do no redress his or her injuries." Id., at f^ 24. "Third, a plaintiff must establish 
that equitable relief, such as an injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect the 
plaintiffs rights or redress his or her injuries." Id., ^ 25. The Jensens have failed to 
satisfy any of these criteria. 
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A. The federal district court and the Tenth Circuit found no evidence 
of a flagrant violation of the Jensens' constitutional rights. 
This court has stated, "A flagrant violation of constitutional rights means "that a 
defendant must have violated "clearly established" constitutional rights "of which a 
reasonable person would have known5'.'9 Id., 11 23; quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "To be considered clearly established, "[t]he contours of the right 
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is 
doing violates that right"." Id.; quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-640 
(1987) "The requirement that the unconstitutional conduct be "flagrant" ensures that a 
government employee is allowed the ordinary "human frailties of forgetfulness, dis-
tractihiiity, oi misjudgment without rendering [him or her]self liable for a constitutional 
violation"" u! (Citation omitted). 
This s^ndard is identical to the federal standard for qualified immunity, which 
immunizes state actors from suit "unless the official's conduct violate[s] a clearly 
established constitutional right." Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 816 (2009). In 
order to establish the standard for a "flagrant violation" of constitutional rights, this Court 
in Spackman relied on Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), dead Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), two seminal qualified immunity cases that the District 
Court and the Tenth Circuit applied in this case. The Jensens concede that the qualified 
immunity and flagrant violation analyses are identical, because they cite only federal 
qualified immunity cases in their supplemental brief. See App. Supp. Brief at 13-18. 
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The Jensens argue that they could establish a flagrant violation "if a jury finds that 
a defendant's actions were motivated by personal reasons." App. Supp. Brief, at 16. The 
Jensens' personal motivation liability theory has no legal basis. A state actor's personal 
belief, feelings or motivations are irrelevant to the right to direct medical care. See Roska 
v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1246-1247 (10th Cir. 2003). Both the federal district court 
and the Tenth Circuit, however, have carefully reviewed the evidence and ruled that no 
reasonable juror could find the defendants committed a flagrant violation of the Jensens' 
clearly established constitutional rights. Their findings pertaining to each right asserted 
by the Jensens in their supplemental brief are set forth below. 
1- Right to Direct Medical Care 
The federal district court ruled that the right to direct medical care is 
^fundamental," "calling for application of the compelling interest/narrowly tailored 
standard." (R. 149.) After reviewing the evidence, the federal district court found that 
"Dr. Wagner's conduct in providing medical care for P.J. and referring his case to DCFS 
after the Jensens would not consent to P.J.'s treatment were narrowly tailored to serve the 
State's compelling interest in protecting children." (R. 155.) The Tenth Circuit affirmed 
this finding, but expressed skepticism that the Jensens had a right to direct medical care in 
these circumstances, ruling that the Jensens did not have a clearly established right to 
disregard the diagnosis and treatment recommendations of no less than seven qualified 
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doctors, as set forth on page 2, above. See Tenth Cir. Order, at 28-29. Thus, two federal 
courts have ruled that the doctors did not violate the Jensens' right to direct medical care. 
2. Right to Follow Medical Recommendations of a Physician 
of Their Choice. 
The federal district court did not find a right to follow the medical recommenda-
tions of a physician of the Jensens choice separate from the right to direct medical care; 
however, the undisputed evidence showed that prior to referral to DCFS, "the Jensens 
were free, at that point, to take P.J. to another facility and another doctor for further 
testing." (R. 151.) "Thus, Dr. Wagner's refusal to order further testing, of itself, did not 
violate the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care free from unreasonable state 
interference/ (R. 151-152.) The Tenth Circuit affirmed this ruling. See Tenth Cir. 
Order, at 28-29. Thus, no reasonable juror could find a flagrant violation of this right 
occurred here. 
3. Right Not To Be Reported for Neglect for Seeking a 
Confirmatory Diagnosis. 
The federal courts did not find this right to be distinct from the right to direct 
medical care. Nevertheless, the federal district court found that the Jensens were free to 
take Parker to another doctor for further testing, as set forth above, and "Dr. Wagner's 
conduct in providing medical care for P.J. and referring his case to DCFS after the 
Jensens would not consent to P.J.'s treatment were narrowly tailored to serve the State's 
compelling interest in protecting children." (R. 155.) The court explained: 
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The record demonstrates that Dr. Wagner referred P.J.'s case to DCFS after 
the Jensens refused to consent to chemotherapy treatment which 
Dr. Wagner reasonably believed was necessary to save P.J.'s life . . . In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court finds it important that any actual 
interference with the Jensens' substantive due process rights was 
accomplished by referring the case to DCFS, filing the Verified Petition, 
and presenting P J.'s case to a neutral judge - not by simply removing P.J. 
from his parents and forcing him to undergo chemotherapy. Indeed, the 
Jensens received ample opportunities to present their side of the story to the 
Juvenile Court. 
(R. 155-156.) The Tenth Circuit affirmed this ruling in the citation included in subsection 
#1 above. See Tenth Cir. Order, at 28-29. Thus, no reasonable juror could find a flagrant 
violation of this right occurred here. 
4, Right to Investigation of Reporting Party's Allegations Prior 
to Instigation of Juvenile Court Proceedings. 
This right concerns the actions of defendants Eisenman, Cunningham and 
Anderson. Th# defendant doctors incorporate these defendants' arguments here. 
5. Right for Juvenile Court Proceedings To Be Free from 
Intentional Material Misrepresentations and Omissions. 
Both the federal district court and the Tenth Circuit ruled that no misrepresen-
tations and/or omissions rendered the juvenile court proceedings constitutionally 
deficient. As noted on page 9 above, the federal district court found that the Jensens 
submitted no evidence that Dr. Wagner misrepresented the events and circumstances 
surrounding Parker's diagnosis to the juvenile court or anyone involved in the juvenile 
court proceedings. See R. 156, 171. The Tenth Circuit affirmed this finding, ruling: 
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[The Jensens] base their claim against Dr. Wagner on misrepresentations he 
allegedly made to the juvenile court and to others involved with the custody 
dispute. The Jensens appear to argue that these misrepresentations infected 
the juvenile proceedings to the point that they did not afford the Jensens the 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. Although we can conceive 
of circumstances in which false testimony may infect a judicial proceeding 
to the point that the proceeding itself becomes constitutionally deficient, the 
Jensens have not demonstrated that any statements by Dr. Wagner had such 
a degenerative effect on the juvenile court proceedings in this case. 
Tenth Cir. Order, at 53. Thus, no reasonable juror could find a flagrant violation of this 
right occurred here, 
6. Right To Be Free from Unreasonable Seizures. 
Both the federal district court and the Tenth Circuit considered this constitutional 
claim^s well 3nd found no constitutional violation occurred. The federal district court 
ruled; "It is undisputed that neither Mr. Jensen nor Ms. Jensen was arrested, incarcerated, 
or orUerw ise placed under the direct physical control of the State as a result of the 
proceedings in the Juvenile Court/' (R. 174.) In fact, the federal district court noted: 
Dr, Wagner moved to Ohio in late June 2003 during the pendency of the 
Juvenile Court proceedings and before any change in P.J.'s legal custody ... 
Initiation and continuation of the criminal case were dependant on multiple 
intervening events, including, most notably, the Jensens failure to comply 
with the Juvenile Court's orders. Thus, Dr. Wagner did not cause the 
initiation or continuation of the criminal case based solely on his referral of 
P.J.'s case to DCFS and his limited participation in the Juvenile Court 
proceedings. 
* * # 
It is clear that neither Dr. Wagner nor Ms. Cunningham caused the 
prosecution of the criminal action against the Jensens. 
* Jjc * 
The Jensens have not submitted any evidence that Dr. Wagner . . . provided 
information to the District Attorney's Office or that their involvement in the 
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Juvenile Court case led to the initiation or continuation of the criminal 
charges. 
(R. 174-178.) The Tenth Circuit affirmed these rulings, stating "P.J. was never physically 
removed from the Jensens' custody and the state afforded the Jensens numerous 
opportunities to obtain treatment for P.J. before it even sought to remove him from their 
custody." Tenth Cir. Order, at 31. 
Because both the Tenth Circuit and the federal district court found no evidence of 
a flagrant violation of the rights the Jensens assert in their supplemental brief, the Jensens 
fail to satisfy the first requirement for recovery under Spackman. 
B. Other remedies were available to the Jensens at the time of the 
alleged deprivations. 
"This second requirement is meant to ensure that courts use their common law 
remedial power cautiously and in favor of existing remedies." Spacbnan v. Board of 
Educ, of Box Elder Co. School Distr., 2000 UT 87, U 24. This Court cautioned: 
We urge caution in light of the myriad policy considerations involved in a 
decision to award damages against a governmental agency and/or its 
employees for a constitutional violation. Moreover, we urge deference to 
existing remedies out of respect for separation of powers' principles. In 
general, the legislative branch has the authority, and in many cases is better 
suited, to establish appropriate remedies for individual injuries. By requir-
ing courts to defer to relevant legislative determinations of appropriate 
remedies, we respect the legislature's important role in our constitutional 
system of government. 
Id 
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The Jensens argue that no statutory or administrative remedies were available. 
More specifically, they argue that they could not appeal any of the Juvenile Court orders. 
However, this argument is directly contradicted by Utah's Juvenile Court Act, which 
provides: "An appeal to the Court of Appeals may be taken from any order, decree, or 
judgment of the juvenile court." U.C.A. § 78-3a-909(l) (2003) (emphasis added). Thus, 
the Jensens could have immediately appealed any of the following 5 orders (3 of which 
the Jensens stipulated to and later violated) entered by the Juvenile Court, but chose not 
to: 
• July 10 - Order requiring the Jensens to seek the opinion of Dr. Tishler at 
CHLA (the Jensens proposed treatment at CHLA and stipulated to 
this Order); 
• July 28 - Order requiring Parker to commence chemotherapy by August 8, 
2003; 
• Aug. 8 - Order to take Parker into protective custody; 
• Sept. 5 - Order to submit Parker to treatment by Dr. Johnston at St. Luke's 
Hospital in Boise, Idaho (plaintiffs stipulated to this Order); 
• Oct. 4 - Order of dismissal (plaintiffs stipulated to this Order). 
See U.C.A. § 78-3a-909(l) (2003); see also In re Schreuder, 649 P.2d 19, 24 (Utah 1982) 
(citation omitted).5 Moreover, the Jensens do not argue that they could not have moved to 
stay the proceedings or petitioned for extraordinary relief. 
The Jensens' argument that they could not appeal these orders is also inconsistent 
with the constitutional rights they have attempted to set forth in their supplemental brief. 
5The Court of Appeals' jurisdiction over appeals from juvenile court is codified at 
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3 (2003). This statute states, "The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: . . . ( c ) appeals from the 
juvenile courts." U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(c) (2003). 
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The Jensens argue that they were entitled to be free from juvenile court proceedings 
(1) for seeking a confirmatory diagnosis, (2) unless DCFS conducted an independent 
investigation, and (3) unless the state could establish their doctor was substantially below 
the norm. They contend that the defendants failed to establish any of these prerequisites 
to referral to the juvenile court. Therefore, according to the Jensens, any juvenile court 
proceeding was unlawful. If this was the case, the Jensens should have immediately filed 
a motion to dismiss the Juvenile Court case. Failing that they could have filed an appeal, 
motion for temporary restraining order, motion to stay, or petition for extraordinary relief 
to prevent any juvenile court proceedings. 
The Jensens, however, chose not to dispute the juvenile court's jurisdiction over 
them: In fact, they fully participated in the juvenile court proceedings. They were 
represented hf counsel, they cross-examined witnesses, they spoke on their own behalf, 
and they even stipulated to three orders. Therefore, the Jensens' argument that they 
couldn't appeal any order is contradicted by the constitutional rights they asserted in their 
supplemental brief and their consent to the juvenile court proceedings. 
The Jensens chose not to explore other remedies. They were entitled to assert their 
constitutional rights before the Juvenile Court, and they did. The Jensens raised 
constitutional defenses in their Answer to the State's Petition. [R. 515 (Ex. 10, pp. 26-
27).] They also requested relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and raised their Due Process 
rights in their Bench Brief. [R. 515 (Ex. 10, p. 28, 193).] In the July 10, 2003, hearing, 
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defendant Eisenman brought the Jensens' Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights to 
the Court's attention: 
I believe, and I think if you read Mr. Mylar's brief, we all agree on the 
constitutional issues. We all agree that the parents have the right to choose 
the treatment for the child as long as it is by a licensed physician and it is 
something that is accepted by the, you know, generally accepted in the 
medical community, or not rejected by the medical community. 
[R. 515 (Ex. 33-B, pp. 9-10).]. Thus, the Jensens raised constitutional defenses before the 
juvenile court. They had their remedy. Since the Jensens explored several remedies 
during the juvenile court proceedings and chose not to appeal any of the Juvenile Court 
orders; therefore they cannot attack the Juvenile Court's orders and the balances struck in 
this tort action, and they fail the second requirement of Spachnan.6 
6The Jensens' argument that no remedies existed in the juvenile court proceeding 
illustrates the problem with reviewing unappealed juvenile court proceedings in a 
subsequent tort action. Their effort to create Utah constitutional substantive due process 
law by this tort action is also ill suited to the development of that law. 
Rather, this law is best examined and developed via direct appeals from Juvenile 
Court Orders. Juvenile court judges weigh and protect the constitutional rights of parents 
and children every day, in nearly every case. Judge Yeates did this and the Jensens have 
not challenged any of his rulings. Had the Jensens directly appealed one of Judge Yeates' 
many rulings, this court could have reviewed the Juvenile Court's orders to determine 
whether their rights under the Utah Constitution were violated. That would have been the 
best way to develop this area of state constitutional law. 
The present procedural posture, however, is much more convoluted. The federal 
district court and Tenth Circuit have already reviewed the juvenile court record and all 
other relevant evidence and determined that no constitutional violations occurred; and this 
court is tasked with determining whether the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case 
bar further litigation of these claims. 
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C. Equitable relief could have prevented any injury the Jensens 
suffered. 
"This final requirement is meant to take advantage of the meaningful role equitable 
relief can play in redressing constitutional injuries, while not implicating so many of the 
difficult policy considerations raised by a decision to award damages." Spackman v. 
Board ofEduc. of Box Elder Sch. Dist, 2000 UT 87, \ 25. In Intermountain Sports, Inc. 
v. Dep 't of Transportation, 2004 UT App. 405, 103 P.3d 716, the Utah Court of Appeals 
rejected a company's claim for damages because it failed to establish that equitable relief 
would not have protected its rights. In that case, a company sued UDOT for state 
constitutional violations stemming from 1-15 reconstruction. The Court dismissed the suit 
because it failed the second and 'hird prongs of the Spackman test, noting, 'Tntermountain 
could have sought an injunction to enjoin UDOT's purported discriminatory actions. 
While the completion of the 1-15 reconstruction makes equitable relief pointless today, 
Intermountain has not established that an injunction was wholly inadequate to protect its 
rights or redress its injuries at the time of the 1-15 construction/' Id., at ^ 20. Similarly, 
the Jensens have failed to established that equitable relief— such as an injunction 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65 A, a writ of mandamus under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d), or a 
motion to dismiss the removal proceeding — was wholly inadequate to protect the rights 
they assert in their supplemental brief.7 
7In a twisted paradox, by their unorthodox conduct in the Juvenile Court, the 
Jensens achieved the same result - avoiding treatment - that equitable relief could have 
yielded. They presented a "moving target" by proposing doctors, delaying treatment, 
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Because the Jensens have failed to satisfy any of the requirements under 
Spackman, summary judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, summary judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this 14th day of June, 2010. 
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fleeing the state, and ignoring court orders. [R. 515 (Ex. 10, p. 446)]. Both the federal 
district court and the Tenth Circuit noted that Daren Jensen even threatened Dr. Martin 
Johnston, a doctor he had selected. Tenth Cir. Order, at 13; R. 130. By way of the 
Jensens' delays, obstinance and shell-games, the Jensens fashioned their own self-help 
equitable relief and enjoined the doctors and the State from treating Parker. This method 
of equitable relief, however, should not be tolerated and certainly fails to satisfy the third 
requirement to recover damages for constitutional violations under Spackman. 
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briefs), Christensen & Jensen, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, appearing for 
Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 
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Before TACHA, ALARCON,* and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. 
TACHA, Circuit Judge. 
There is perhaps no more delicate constitutional barrier protecting 
individual freedom from governmental interference than that which protects 
against state interference with parental autonomy. The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state," Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), and that "the custody, care and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor 
hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). It is also well-
Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
-2-
settled, however, that "[a] democratic society rests for its continuance upon the 
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity," and that states 
"may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of 
selection." Id. at 168. Because of the importance of parental rights and the 
concomitant interest of the state in the health and safety of minor children within 
its borders, the intersection of individual freedom and state authority is always 
difficult to traverse when a child's life is at stake. This case arises at this 
difficult constitutional intersection and involves both parents and state actors who 
genuinely sought to do what they believed was best for a child who was tragically 
stricken with a life-threatening illness. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, and for the reasons discussed below we REVERSE in part and AFFIRM 
in part the decision of the district court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case was initiated by P.J., a minor child, and his 
parents Daren and Barbara Jensen.1 The defendants are five state actors who were 
involved in the legal dispute in a Utah juvenile court over P.J.'s custody and 
medical care. Those state actors include: (1) Susan Eisenman, the Assistant Utah 
Attorney General who prosecuted the juvenile case on behalf of the state; (2) Dr. 
Karen Albritton, the state's expert medical witness throughout the juvenile court 
Although P.J. is a named party, the Jensens do not assert any claims on 
appeal that implicate his independent rights. Accordingly, we only address Mr. 
and Mrs. Jensen's rights in this appeal. 
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proceedings; (3) Dr. Lars Wagner, the doctor at Primary Children's Medical 
Center ("PCMC") who initially diagnosed P.J.'s illness and who referred P.J.'s 
case to the state; (4) Kari Cunningham, the Utah Division of Child and Family 
Services ("DCFS") social worker who initiated the custody petition on behalf of 
the state; and (5) Richard Anderson, the DCFS director who, late in the 
proceedings, attempted to negotiate a resolution to P.J.'s case.2 
On April 30, 2003, an oral surgeon removed a small growth from the floor 
of P.J.'s mouth. After laboratory testing revealed that the growth was malignant, 
the surgeon referred the Jensens to PCMC where they ultimately met with Dr. 
Wagner in the hospital's oncology department. On May 20, 2003, Dr. Amy 
Lowichik completed a pathology report on the growth removed from P.J.'s mouth. 
Dr. Cheryl Coffin, another pathologist, concurred in the report. The report 
diagnosed the growth as Ewing's sarcoma, a rare form of cancer, based on a 
testing procedure known as immunohistochemical staining and on the morphology 
of the tumor cells. Dr. Wagner discussed the pathology report with Dr. Coffin, 
who expressed confidence in the diagnosis and explained that no further testing 
was necessary to confirm it, even though other tests such as cytogenetic or 
molecular testing were available. 
On May 21, 2003, Dr. Wagner met with the Jensens to explain P.J.'s 
2The Jensens named additional defendants in their complaint, but they are 
no longer parties at this point in the litigation. 
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diagnosis. During this consultation, Dr. Wagner explained that P.J.'s disease was 
life threatening and expressed his belief that immediate chemotherapy treatment 
was necessary to save P.J.'s life. When the Jensens asked if any further tests 
could be performed to confirm the diagnosis, Dr. Wagner said no. The Jensens 
requested that Dr. Wagner send P.J.'s tissue sample to the Dana-Farber Cancer 
Institute at Harvard University for a second opinion. Dr. Wagner complied with 
this request; however, the Jensens ultimately canceled the Dana-Farber review. 
On May 29, 2003, the Jensens returned to PCMC to meet with Dr. Wagner. 
During this meeting, the Jensens requested that Dr. Wagner perform a Positron 
Emission Tomography ("PET") scan to confirm the Ewing's diagnosis. Dr. 
Wagner refused to order the PET scan, explained that such a test would not be 
useful, and stated that even a negative scan would not change his opinion that P.J. 
need immediate chemotherapy. The Jensens asked Dr. Wagner again if further 
testing could be performed to confirm P.J.'s diagnosis, and Dr. Wagner again said 
no. Additionally, the Jensens asked Dr. Wagner to consider an alternative 
treatment to chemotherapy called Insulin Potentiation Therapy ("IPT"). Dr. 
Wagner stated that he was unfamiliar with IPT but that he would examine it as an 
alternative treatment method. After consulting with other doctors and performing 
independent research on IPT, Dr. Wagner concluded that there was insufficient 
data available about the treatment's safety and effectiveness, and it therefore was 
not a viable treatment option for P.J. 
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On June 5, 2003, Dr. Wagner reported his conclusions about IPT to the 
Jensens and reiterated his belief that immediate chemotherapy treatment was 
necessary to save P.J.'s life. During this communication, Dr. Wagner also 
informed the Jensens of his legal and ethical duty to report P.J.'s case to DCFS if 
P.J.'s best medical interests were not being addressed. Because it appeared that 
Dr. Wagner and the Jensens had reached an impasse regarding the best course of 
treatment for P.J., a meeting among Dr. Wagner, the Jensens, and other PCMC 
staff was scheduled for June 9, 2003 at PCMC. During the June 9 meeting, Dr. 
Wagner again expressed his belief that immediate chemotherapy was necessary to 
save P.J.'s life, and the head of PCMC's quality assurance department informed 
the Jensens that it may be necessary to refer P.J.'s case to DCFS. Nevertheless, 
the Jensens refused to consent to chemotherapy and told the PCMC 
representatives that they were fired. 
On June 16, 2003, Dr. Wagner formally referred P.J.'s case to DCFS. Ms. 
Cunningham was assigned to the case. Ms. Cunningham believed, based on the 
information provided to her by Dr. Wagner and another PCMC doctor, that P.J.'s 
situation presented a medical emergency that had to be addressed immediately. 
Accordingly, she did not contact the Jensens or perform any investigation; rather, 
she filed a Verified Petition and Motion to Transfer Custody and Guardianship 
("verified petition") in the Utah juvenile court based entirely on the information 
she received from the doctors. The juvenile court set the first hearing on the 
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verified petition for June 20, 2003. 
Upon receiving notice of the verified petition, the Jensens obtained an 
attorney and had more tissue removed from P.J.'s mouth for independent testing. 
That tissue was sent to a pathologist at the University of Washington, who 
ultimately diagnosed it as Ewing's sarcoma. Additionally, the Jensens contacted 
Dr. John Thomson, a radiation oncologist at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, who completed a written report on June 19, 2003, confirming the original 
diagnosis. The report stated, "It is my opinion that [P.J.] has a Stage 1 or Group 
1 nonosseous Ewing sarcoma with a favorable prognosis when treated to the 
standard of care with poly chemotherapy . . . [and I] doubt that further pathologic 
evaluation would alter recommended therapy. . . ." 
On June 20, 2003, the Jensens made their first appearance in the juvenile 
court. At the initial hearing, the Jensens explained to the court that they were 
seeking further tests. In addition, the Jensens and the state indicated that it might 
be possible to reach a stipulation regarding P.J.'s treatment. Accordingly, the 
juvenile court continued the hearing until July 10, 2003. 
Around the time of the initial hearing, the Jensens contacted Dr. Jeorg 
Birkmayer, who practiced in Vienna, Austria. Dr. Birkmayer indicated that he 
was not "totally convinced" that P.J. had Ewing's sarcoma and suggested that he 
was not sure that chemotherapy was necessary. When Ms. Eisenman learned of 
the Jensens' contact with Dr. Birkmayer and their desire to have him supervise 
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P.J.'s treatment, she sent Dr. Birkmayer an e-mail in which she inquired about his 
qualifications and whether Austria had a similar standard of care to that in the 
United States. According to the Jensens, they ultimately abandoned their plan to 
retain Dr. Birkmayer because DCFS insisted that P.J.'s medical care be provided 
by a board-certified pediatric oncologist, which Dr. Birkmayer apparently was 
not. 
At the July 10, 2003 hearing, the juvenile court sustained an objection 
made by the Jensens' attorney which prevented DCFS from presenting evidence 
supporting its verified petition because the hearing had been set for a pre-trial 
conference and not an evidentiary hearing. The Jensens questioned whether P.J. 
actually had Ewing's sarcoma, but a stipulation was reached under which the 
Jensens would have P.J. examined at the Children's Hospital of Los Angeles 
("CHLA") and would abide by that hospital's treatment recommendations. Based 
on this stipulation, the juvenile court again continued the case until July 28, 2003. 
On July 21, 2003, the Jensens met with Dr. David Tishler at CHLA. 
During the consultation, Dr. Tishler informed the Jensens that he would wait to 
give his final recommendation until independent CHLA tests had been performed 
but that he was initially recommending chemotherapy treatment based on the tests 
that had already been completed. The Jensens were dissatisfied with Dr. Tishler's 
recommendation and, in violation of their stipulated agreement, they never 
returned to CHLA. Instead, the Jensens sought care from Dr. Charles Simone, a 
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New Jersey doctor who ultimately refused to be involved in P.J.'s case because he 
did not want to become embroiled in a legal battle. 
At the July 28, 2003 hearing, the juvenile court received testimony from 
Dr. Tishler. He stated that CHLA testing was not yet complete but that there was 
no question P.J. had a malignant tumor which required immediate chemotherapy. 
Dr. Tishler also testified that the specific tests being performed by CHLA would 
only serve to clarify the specific type of chemotherapy that would be best for P.J. 
The Jensens' attorney argued that not all testing had been completed and 
advocated for the Jensens' desire to conduct additional tests. The Jensens also 
expressed their preference that Dr. Simone serve as P.J.'s primary physician. 
DCFS's expert medical witness, Dr. Albritton, however, explained to the juvenile 
court that Dr. Simone should not be P.J.'s primary physician because he was not a 
board-certified pediatric oncologist. Dr. Tishler agreed and testified that 
"[t]here's no other physician that could lead the care and provide the care." 
Based on Dr. Albritton's and Dr. Tishler's testimony, the juvenile court 
ordered that P.J. begin receiving chemotherapy treatment by August 8, 2003, 
regardless of the results of the CHLA testing. Furthermore, the juvenile court 
ordered that P.J.'s primary physician be a board-certified pediatric oncologist but 
that Dr. Simone could work with P.J. in conjunction with his other approved 
doctors. Finally, the juvenile court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the verified 
petition for August 20, 2003, in the event that P.J.'s case was not yet resolved by 
-9-
then. 
On August 7, 2003, one day before P.J. was ordered to commence 
chemotherapy treatment, the Jensens obtained an appointment to meet with 
doctors at the Burzynski Clinic in Houston, Texas, on August 12. On August 8, 
the Jensens violated the juvenile court's order by taking P.J. out of Utah to a 
friend's lake house in Idaho rather than beginning the court-ordered 
chemotherapy treatment. When Ms. Eisenman did not receive confirmation that 
P.J. had commenced chemotherapy treatment, she sought an immediate hearing 
with the juvenile court for the purpose of obtaining authorization to take P.J. into 
protective custody. Ms. Eisenman, Ms. Cunningham, Dr. Albritton, P.J.'s 
guardian ad litem, and the Jensens' attorney participated in that hearing, which 
took place on August 8. At the hearing, the Jensens' attorney informed the 
juvenile court that P.J. was not receiving chemotherapy treatment, that the 
Jensens did not want P.J. to receive chemotherapy treatment, and that the Jensens 
were going to have P.J. evaluated at the Burzynski Clinic. Dr. Albritton indicated 
that the Burzynski Clinic was not a suitable facility for P.J. because: Dr. 
Burzynski was not a board-certified pediatric oncologist; Dr. Albritton was not 
aware of any board-certified pediatric oncologists on staff at the Burzynski 
Clinic; and the Burzynski Clinic was not an appropriate treatment facility for 
newly-diagnosed cancer patients who had not exhausted standard treatment 
options. 
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At the conclusion of the hearing, Ms. Eisenman filed an application to take 
P.J. into protective custody that was supported by affidavits from Dr. Wagner and 
Ms. Cunningham. The juvenile court ordered the custody transfer, and Ms. 
Eisenman contacted the Sandy City Police Department to execute the warrant. 
The Sandy City Police were unable to serve the warrant, however, because the 
Jensens had already left the state. When the Jensens' attorney informed them that 
the juvenile court had ordered that P.J. be taken into state custody to begin 
chemotherapy treatment, the Jensens ignored the order and allegedly decided to 
continue with their plans to have P.J. evaluated at the Burzynski Clinic on August 
12. 
On August 13, 2003, P.J.'s guardian ad litem filed a motion for an order to 
show cause in the juvenile court which ultimately resulted in that court's issuance 
of a bench warrant for the Jensens' arrest and an order requiring the Jensens to 
appear and present P.J. Ms. Eisenman informed the Jensens' attorney and P.J.'s 
guardian ad litem that if the Jensens did not comply with the order she would 
contact local and federal law enforcement authorities. On August 15, 2003, the 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office agreed to screen P.J.'s case at Ms. 
Eisenman's request and ultimately filed criminal charges of misdemeanor 
custodial interference and felony kidnaping against both Mr. and Mrs. Jensen. 
Although the Jensens claim they left Utah on August 7 only to have a brief 
family vacation before taking P.J. to the Burzynski Clinic on August 12, the 
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Jensens and P.J. were at Mrs. Jensen's parents' Idaho home on August 16, 2003, 
and had not yet been to the Burzynski Clinic. On that day, Mrs. Jensen allowed 
P.J. to drive the family car down her parents' long driveway to retrieve the mail. 
P.J. wrecked the vehicle, and neighbors who saw the accident called the police. 
Mrs. Jensen then fled her parents' home with P.J. in an effort to hide him from 
the authorities. When police arrived, Mr. Jensen falsely reported that P.J.'s 
brother had been driving the vehicle when the accident occurred. When officers 
realized there was a warrant for his arrest, they took Mr. Jensen into custody and 
he was released on bail four days later. Meanwhile, Mrs. Jensen attempted to 
take P.J. to the Burzynski Clinic in Houston, but she was turned away because of 
the Utah custody order. 
On August 20, 2003, the juvenile court held a hearing at which the Jensens' 
attorney read a letter by Mr. Jensen and explained the Jensens' desire to present 
evidence. The juvenile court set an evidentiary hearing, but refused to lift the 
warrants it had issued for the Jensens' arrest. Shortly after the August 20 hearing, 
Ms. Eisenman assumed a new position in the Utah Attorney General's Office and 
did not further participate in P.J.'s case. Around this time, Mr. Anderson was 
asked by a representative from the Utah governor's office to attempt to negotiate 
a resolution with the Jensens. Accordingly, Mr. Anderson traveled to Idaho on 
August 27, 2003, where he met with the Jensens for several days. 
On September 5, 2003, the parties entered into a stipulated agreement under 
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which the Jensens would submit P.J. to the care of Dr. Martin Johnston, a board-
certified pediatric oncologist in Boise, Idaho. The Jensens further agreed that 
they would abide by Dr. Johnston's treatment recommendations, even if he 
recommended chemotherapy. Based on these assurances, the juvenile court 
approved the stipulated agreement and returned full custody of P.J. to the Jensens. 
After evaluating P. J., Dr. Johnston informed the Jensens of his diagnosis 
and recommended treatment. In a letter to the Jensens, Dr. Johnston stated, 
"There has never been any question but that the tumor is a high-grade sarcoma, 
most compatible with a Ewing's sarcoma. After full review, I have arrived at the 
same conclusion." Dr. Johnston's letter also recommended chemotherapy 
treatment. In violation of the September 5 stipulation, however, the Jensens 
refused to submit P.J. to chemotherapy treatment and claimed that Dr. Johnston 
was merely rubber-stamping previous doctors' diagnoses. Additionally, Mr. 
Jensen threatened Dr. Johnston, stating that if P.J. ever received chemotherapy 
treatment at Dr. Johnston's hospital, "I'm going to make sure it's a hellish 
experience for everybody involved. I'm going to shut down this clinic, I'm going 
to shut down this hospital, and I'm going to fight you tooth and nail the whole 
way." 
On October 2, 2003, the Jensens entered into a plea agreement which 
resolved their criminal charges. Under the agreement, the Jensens pleaded guilty 
to the misdemeanor custodial interference charge in exchange for the state's 
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promise to drop the felony kidnaping charge. The state dropped the felony charge 
and the Utah district court accepted the Jensens' guilty plea in abeyance on the 
misdemeanor charge. 
On October 8, 2003, Dr. Johnston informed the juvenile court that he had 
diagnosed P.J. with Ewing's sarcoma, that he had recommended chemotherapy 
treatment, and that the Jensens had refused to commence his recommended 
treatment. Assistant Attorney General Mark May, who had taken the case over 
from Ms. Eisenman, informed the juvenile court that the parties would attempt to 
reach a settlement. Then, on October 22, 2003, DCFS filed a motion to dismiss 
the verified petition. In its motion, DCFS indicated that although it was confident 
that without chemotherapy treatment P.J.'s chance of survival would fall 
dramatically, the state had concluded that forcing P.J. to undergo chemotherapy 
treatment had become unworkable because of the Jensens' refusal to obtain such 
treatment under any circumstances. Furthermore, DCFS indicated that the state's 
interest in the case had shifted such that attempting to force chemotherapy 
treatment and placing the Jensens in jail would no longer be in P.J.'s best interest 
and indeed may "impede [his] medical treatment." Accordingly, the juvenile 
court dismissed P.J.'s case and terminated its jurisdiction over the matter. 
In July 2005, the Jensens filed this § 1983 civil suit for damages in state 
court against eight state actors involved in P.J.'s case. After the case was 
removed to federal court and several defendants were dismissed, the Jensens' 
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present claims against the five current defendants remained. The Jensens alleged 
that each of the five defendants remaining in this case violated their: (1) 
substantive due process right to direct P.J.'s medical care; (2) substantive due 
process right to familial association; (3) procedural due process rights; and (4) 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure based on the 
alleged malicious prosecution of the Jensens. All five defendants filed motions 
for summary judgment based on claims of absolute or qualified immunity, and Dr. 
Albritton and Dr. Wagner argued that the entire case should be dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldrnan doctrine. See Rooker v. Fid. 
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 
(1983). The district court rejected the doctors' Rooker-Feldrnan argument, 
concluded that Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton were absolutely immune from 
suit, concluded that the Jensens failed to overcome the remaining defendants' 
claims of qualified immunity, and ultimately granted all five defendants' motions 
for summary judgment. The Jensens appeal from the district court's summary 
judgment order, and Dr. Albritton and Dr. Wagner cross-appeal from the district 
court's denial of summary judgment based on their jurisdictional argument. 
II. DISCUSSION 
We review de novo the district court's decision to grant each defendant 
summary judgment, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Turner v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th 
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Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates "that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Once the movant shows 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party "must bring 
forward specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive 
matters for which he or she carries the burden of proof." Garrison v. Gambro, 
Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005). This requires the non-moving party to 
present sufficient facts that a reasonable jury could find in his or her favor. Id. 
A. Jurisdictional Issues—The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 
Because it implicates our subject matter jurisdiction, we address the cross-
appellants' claim that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this entire § 1983 suit 
before turning to the merits of the case. See Crutchfield v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, 389 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 2004) (addressing Rooker-Feldman 
argument before considering the merits and explaining that the issue is integral to 
subject matter jurisdiction). Generally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes 
lower federal courts "from effectively exercising appellate jurisdiction over 
claims actually decided by a state court and claims inextricably intertwined with a 
prior state-court judgment." Mo's Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1233 
(10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court recently clarified the 
narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, stating that it is "confined to cases 
of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-
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court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review 
and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 
In light of Exxon, we have concluded that "the type of judicial action 
barred by Rooker-Feldman [] consists of a review of the proceedings already 
conducted by the 'lower' tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in 
accordance with law." Boldenv. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1143 (10th Cir. 
2006). In this way, we have explained that "Rooker-Feldman does not bar 
federal-court claims that would be identical even had there been no state-court 
judgment; that is, claims that do not rest on any allegation concerning the state-
court proceedings or judgment." Id. at 1J45. 
Additionally, our recent Rooker-Feldman jurisprudence has emphasized the 
relief sought by federal-court plaintiffs. See Mo 's Express, LLC, 441 F.3d at 
1237 ("[W]e approach the [Rooker-Feldman] question by asking whether the 
state-court judgment caused, actually and proximately, the injury for which the 
federal-court plaintiff seeks redress."). In Mo's Express, LLC, we concluded that 
federal-court plaintiffs who only sought prospective injunctive and declaratory 
relief were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because "their federal suit 
would not reverse or otherwise 'undo' the relief granted by the [state court] . . . ." 
Id. at 1238. Conversely, we recently held that a federal-court plaintiffs claims 
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seeking monetary damages from government actors who complied with probate 
court orders unfavorable to the plaintiff were barred by the Rooker-Feldrnan 
doctrine because success on the claims "would require the district court to review 
and reject [the probate court's] judgments." Mann v. Boatright, All F.3d 1140, 
1147 (10th Cir. 2007). 
Given this framework, we first identify the two state-court judgments 
adverse to the Jensens that neither the federal district court nor this court may 
review or undo in any way: (1) the juvenile court's August 8 order granting the 
state custody over P.J.; and (2) the state district court's October 2 order accepting 
the Jensens' guilty pleas for misdemeanor custodial interference. The district 
court concluded that none of the Jensens' claims are barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine because the "constitutional injury alleged by the Jensens is 
separate and independent from any orders of the state courts . . . ." 
On appeal, the Jensens base their substantive and procedural due process 
claims on misrepresentations allegedly made by the defendants during the 
juvenile court proceedings and with respect to P.J.'s medical treatment, and on 
DCFS's alleged failure to conduct an independent investigation of P.J.'s case 
before filing the verified petition. Without addressing every underlying factual 
allegation against each defendant here, we agree with the district court that each 
of these claims "seek[s] relief independent from any judgment rendered by the 
state courts." Although the alleged misrepresentations and failure to investigate 
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are closely connected to the juvenile court proceedings and the Jensens' criminal 
prosecution, they are sufficiently extricable from any state-court judgment for 
Rooker-Feldman purposes. Indeed, the Jensens' substantive and procedural due 
process claims would be identical even if there were no state-court orders adverse 
to the Jensens. Therefore, these claims do not allege "injuries caused by state-
court judgments," Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284, and thus are not barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. 
Conversely, the Jensens' malicious prosecution claims necessarily invite 
federal-court undoing of the two adverse state-court orders. To succeed on their § 
1983 malicious prosecution claims, the Jensens must prove: (1) the defendants 
caused their continued confinement or prosecution; (2) some original action 
terminated in favor of the Jensens; (3) no probable cause supported the Jensens' 
original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendants acted 
with malice; and (5) the Jensens sustained damages. Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 
F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, to satisfy the third element of their 
malicious prosecution claims, the Jensens must convince a lower federal court 
that there was no probable cause for the prosecution of either the juvenile court 
proceedings or the criminal proceedings. As discussed above, however, those 
state-court proceedings resulted in adverse judgments for the Jensens. Therefore, 
a lower federal court would necessarily have to review and reject those judgments 
in order for the Jensens to succeed on their malicious prosecution claims. 
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Furthermore, "[t]he Fourth Amendment in the context of a malicious 
prosecution claim deals with judicial determinations of probable cause . . . ." Id. 
at 802. And, the Jensens may only show the existence of a Fourth Amendment 
violation if they can show that the legal process itself was wrongful. Id. at 798. 
We fail to see how a federal court could conclude that the juvenile proceedings or 
the Jensens' criminal prosecution themselves were wrongful without reviewing 
and, in essence, reversing the adverse state-court judgments that were the 
products of those proceedings. Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the 
Jensens' malicious prosecution claims. 
B. Absolute Immunity—Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton 
Next, we address the Jensens' claim that the district court erred by granting 
Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton absolute immunity from this § 1983 suit.3 We 
review de novo a district court's conclusion that a defendant is entitled to 
absolute immunity. Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 908 (10th Cir. 2000). 
"'[A]bsolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions 
were within the scope of the immunity.'" Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 
1377, 1381 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 
3The district court also granted Ms. Cunningham absolute prosecutorial 
immunity for her decision to file the verified petition in juvenile court, but denied 
her absolute immunity for her other actions in this case. On appeal, the Jensens 
do not object to this conclusion and Ms. Cunningham does not seek broader 
absolute immunity protection than what the district court granted her. 
Accordingly, we do not address the propriety of the district court's decision in 
this regard. 
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(1976)). Under our functional approach to claims of absolute immunity, we 
examine whether the particular actions of the defendant are within the scope of 
the claimed immunity, not whether the status of the defendant or the office that 
she holds entitles her to protection. See, e.g., Perez v. Ellington, 421 F.3d 1128, 
1133 (10th Cir. 2005). 
1. Ms. Eisenman 
"State attorneys . . . who perform functions analogous to those of a 
prosecutor in initiating and pursuing civil and administrative enforcement 
proceedings are absolutely immune from suit under section 1983 concerning 
activities intimately associated with the judicial process." Scott, 216 F.3d at 908 
(internal quotations omitted). Such government actors are not immune, however, 
for actions "that are primarily investigative or administrative in nature." Pfeiffer 
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 (10th Cir. 1991). To distinguish 
between actions that are intimately associated with the judicial process and those 
that are investigative or administrative in nature, we look to whether the actions 
can rightly be considered advocacy "because that is the prosecutor's main 
function and the one most akin to his quasi-judicial role." Id. Furthermore, 
"absolute immunity may attach even to . . . administrative or investigative 
activities 'when these functions are necessary so that a prosecutor may fulfill his 
function as an officer of the court.'" Id. (quoting Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 
693 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
-21-
The Jensens base their claims against Ms. Eisenman on: (1) 
misrepresentations she allegedly made to the juvenile court; (2) her research 
regarding the American Academy of Pediatrics's guidelines for clinicians who 
render pediatric care and her resistance to the Jensens' attempt to have P.J. 
treated by doctors who were not qualified under those guidelines; and (3) 
misrepresentations she allegedly made to the Salt Lake County District Attorney. 
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that any statements Ms. Eisenman made to 
the juvenile court were made in her role as an advocate for the state's interest in 
the custody dispute. Likewise, any research Ms. Eisenman performed regarding 
the appropriate type of doctor for P.J. and any actions she took to ensure that P.J. 
was treated by an appropriately credentialed doctor were intimately associated 
with the judicial process and Ms. Eisenman's role as an advocate for the state. 
Therefore, those actions are clearly within the scope of Ms. Eisenman's claimed 
absolute immunity. 
The protection afforded Ms. Eisenman's statements to the Salt Lake County 
District Attorney, however, is less clear. The Jensens argue that by making 
misrepresentations to the Salt Lake County District Attorney which eventually led 
to their criminal prosecution, Ms. Eisenman was acting as a complaining witness 
rather than as a prosecutor. Furthermore, the Jensens correctly point out that a 
complaining witness is not entitled to absolute immunity. See Malley v. Briggs, 
475 U.S. 335, 340-41 (1986). Under the circumstances of this case, however, we 
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agree with the district court that Ms. Eisenman's presentation of facts to the Salt 
Lake County District Attorney was intimately associated with the juvenile court 
process and was done in Ms. Eisenman's role as an advocate for the state. The 
day Ms. Eisenman met with the Salt Lake County District Attorney, the juvenile 
court had ordered the Jensens to present P.J. to the court for the purpose of 
beginning chemotherapy treatment. The Jensens were aware of this juvenile court 
order and had, in fact, stated their intention not to comply with it. Furthermore, 
the Jensens admit they were attempting to hide P.J. from state authorities in order 
to prevent the effectuation of the juvenile court order. Under these 
circumstances, Ms. Eisenman's presentation of evidence to the Salt Lake County 
District Attorney was necessary to effectuate the juvenile court's order and to 
pursue the interest of the state in ensuring that P.J. receive treatment for his life-
threatening illness. Accordingly, these actions were necessary to fulfill both her 
roles as officer of the court and advocate for the state, and are therefore protected 
by absolute immunity. 
2. Dr. Albritton 
Like the absolute immunity afforded prosecutors who perform actions 
intimately associated with the judicial process, "[t]he immunity of parties and 
witnesses from subsequent damages liability for their testimony injudicial 
proceedings is well established in the common law. . . ." Spielman, 873 F.2d at 
1382. Testifying witness immunity is "supported by the public policy of 
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preserving the truthfmding process from distortions caused by fear of suit.5' Id. 
The Jensens' claims against Dr. Albritton center on her testimony before the 
juvenile court; the Jensens allege that her testimony contained various 
misrepresentations and "had more the flavor of someone working to perpetuate 
proceedings (i.e., a complaining witness), than merely providing objective 
information." This contention reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
well-established immunity for testifying witnesses. A witness is absolutely 
immune from civil liability based on any testimony the witness provides during a 
judicial proceeding "even if the witness knew the statements were false and made 
them with malice." Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 332 (1983). Thus, even if 
Dr. Albritton's testimony was aimed at perpetuating the custody proceedings 
against the Jensens, she is protected by absolute immunity. Accordingly, Dr. 
Albritton is absolutely immune from any claims against her in this § 1983 suit. 
C. Qualified Immunity—Dr. Wagner, Ms. Cunningham, and Mr. Anderson 
Finally, we address the Jensens' constitutional claims against Dr. Wagner, 
Ms. Cunningham, and Mr. Anderson, who have all claimed a defense of qualified 
immunity. "When a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the 
heavy burden of establishing: (1) that the defendant's actions violated a federal 
constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the right violated was clearly 
established at the time of the defendant's actions." Scott, 216 F.3d at 910 
(quotations omitted). Federal courts may "exercise their sound discretion in 
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deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." 
Pearson v. Callahan, - U.S. - , 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). 
The "clearly established" prong of the qualified immunity analysis ensures 
that governmental actors are given fair warning that their conduct is 
unconstitutional before they are held liable for damages based on that conduct. 
Harman v. Pollock, 586 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2009). A right is clearly 
established "when a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision is on point, or if the 
clearly established weight of authority from other courts shows that the right must 
be as [the] plaintiff maintains." Id. at 1261. That does not mean that we must 
have previously decided a case that is materially factually similar or identical to 
the present case; instead, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear 
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that 
right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
L The Jensens' Substantive Due Process Right to Direct P.J. 's Medical 
Care 
The district court concluded that the Jensens failed to show that any 
defendant violated their right to direct PJ . ' s medical care. Because the district 
court decided this issue under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, it 
did not have occasion to consider whether the Jensens' right to direct PJ . ' s 
medical care in the circumstances presented in this case was clearly established at 
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the time of the alleged violations. Furthermore, on appeal, the Jensens confine 
their argument to the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis and assume 
that under the circumstances of this case their right to direct P.J.'s medical care is 
clearly established. We reject this assumption and conclude that the Jensens' 
right to direct P.J.'s medical care in this case—if any right indeed exists in such 
circumstances—was not clearly established at the time the Jensens allege the right 
was violated. 
We begin by acknowledging that the Due Process Clause generally provides 
constitutional protection for parental rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated 
that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the 
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of their children." Troxelv. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
Furthermore, although we have never specifically recognized or defined the scope 
of a parent's right to direct her child's medical care, see Roska v. Peterson, 328 
F.3d 1230, 1247 n.14 (10th Cir. 2003) ("We express no opinion on whether such a 
right [to direct a child's medical care] might exist within the context of general 
familial rights."), we do not doubt that a parent's general right to make decisions 
concerning the care of her child includes, to some extent, a more specific right to 
make decisions about the child's medical care. See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 
336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003) ("It is not implausible to think that rights 
invoked here—the right to refuse a medical exam and the parent's right to control 
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the upbringing, including the medical care, of a child—fall within [the Due 
Process Clause's] sphere of protected liberty."). 
The Supreme Court has similarly alluded to, but never specifically defined 
the scope of a parent's right to direct her child's medical care. Indeed, the Court 
has recognized that "[m]ost children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to 
make sound judgments concerning . . . their need for medical care or treatment," 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979), and that our legal system presumes 
"that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their 
children." Id. at 602. Therefore, this precedent reasonably suggests that the Due 
Process Clause provides some level of protection for parents' decisions regarding 
their children's medical care. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized, however, that parental rights, 
including any right to direct a child's medical care, are not absolute. See Prince 
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[N]either rights of religion nor 
rights of parenthood are beyond limitation."); see also Parham, 442 U.S. at 604 
("[P]arents cannot always have absolute and unreviewable discretion to decide 
whether to [seek specific medical care for their children]," but they "retain 
plenary authority to seek such care for their children, subject to a physician's 
independent examination and medical judgment."). Indeed, states have a 
compelling interest in and a solemn duty to protect the lives and health of the 
children within their borders. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court 
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for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) ("[Safeguarding the physical and 
psychological well-being of a minor . . . is a compelling [interest]."). 
Accordingly, when a child's life or health is endangered by her parents' 
decisions, in some circumstances a state may intervene without violating the 
parents' constitutional rights. See Par ham, 442 U.S. at 603 ("[W]e have 
recognized that a state is not without constitutional control over parental 
discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is 
jeopardized."). 
Under this constitutional framework, we conclude that the Jensens' asserted 
right to direct P.J.'s medical care in this case is not clearly established. The 
record demonstrates that no less than seven qualified and competent doctors 
evaluated P.J., diagnosed him with life-threatening cancer, and recommended that 
he immediately undergo chemotherapy treatment in order to save his life. In this 
particular situation, the Jensens did not have a clearly established constitutional 
right to refuse the unanimous recommended treatment or to solicit additional 
opinions until they found a doctor who disagreed that conventional treatment was 
necessary. Indeed, the Jensens had a "'high duty' to recognize symptoms of 
illness and to seek and follow medical advice." Id. at 602. 
Furthermore, when a child's life is under immediate threat, a state's interest 
in protecting the child is at its zenith, and a state has broad authority to intervene 
in parental decisionmaking that produces the threat to the child's life. See Prince, 
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321 U.S. at 167 ("[T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental 
freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare."). Here, the state 
was endowed with this broad authority, and the Jensens do not direct us to a 
clearly established constitutional line that defines what a state can and cannot do 
to protect a child whose life is compromised by his parents' refusal to obtain 
medical care. Certainly, the Jensens do not assert any factual allegation that is 
substantially supported in the record which would constitute state action that is 
clearly outside the state's "wide range of power." Accordingly, under the 
circumstances of this case, the Jensens' asserted right to direct P.J.'s medical care 
was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violations; therefore, they 
cannot overcome the defendants' claims of qualified immunity. 
2. The Jensens' Substantive Due Process Right to Familial Association 
In contrast to the Jensens' purported right to direct P.J.'s medical care in 
this case, we resolve their claims regarding their substantive due process right to 
familial association and their procedural due process rights on the first prong of 
the qualified immunity inquiry—namely, that the Jensens have not shown a 
violation of their constitutional rights. 
More than twenty-five years ago the Supreme Court recognized that 
"[f]amily relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and 
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not 
only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also 
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distinctively personal aspects of one's life." Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609, 619-620 (1984). Shortly thereafter, this court first recognized the existence 
of a right to familial association within the substantive rights protected by the 
Due Process Clause. See Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1546-47 (10th Cir. 
1993) (discussing the development of the right of familial association in the Tenth 
Circuit). In numerous decisions since the right was first recognized, we have 
applied a balancing test to determine whether the plaintiffs right to familial 
association has been infringed. See, e.g., id. at 1547-49; J.B. v. Washington 
County, 127 F.3d 919, 927 (10th Cir. 1997); Lowery v. County of Riley, 522 F.3d 
1086, 1092 (10th Cir. 2008). Under this test, "we balance 'the individual's 
interest in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining individual 
liberty.'" Lowery, 522 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 
320 (1982)). The purpose of the balancing test is to ascertain whether a 
defendant's conduct constitutes an undue burden on the plaintiffs associational 
rights. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1547. 
Because the Jensens' opening brief fails to articulate a particularized 
factual allegation that any defendant violated their associational rights, we 
address their general claims under the balancing test discussed above. First, the 
Jensens' interest in associating with P.J. is unquestionably of paramount 
importance. See id. at 1548 ("The right to associate with one's family is a very 
substantial right."); see also U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618 ("[F]reedom of 
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association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty."). 
Second, as discussed above, the state's interest in protecting and safeguarding 
P.J.'s life is also significant. Finally, given these countervailing interests, the 
record demonstrates that the actual burden on the Jensens' right to associate with 
P.J. was minimal in this case. The Jensens correctly point out that "the forced 
separation of parent from child, even for a short time, represents a serious 
impingement." J.B., 127 F.3d at 925 (alteration omitted). In this case, however, 
P.J. was never physically removed from the Jensens' custody and the state 
afforded the Jensens numerous opportunities to obtain treatment for P.J. before it 
even sought to remove him from their custody. Under these circumstances, the 
Jensens fail to show that any defendant imposed an undue burden on their 
relationship with P.J. and therefore fail to show a violation of their associational 
rights. 
3. The Jensens' Procedural Due Process Rights 
"[Procedural due process does not prevent the state from depriving an 
individual of liberty or property. It only requires that a fair procedure be 
provided for the deprivation." Doyle v. Okla. Bar Ass % 998 F.2d 1559, 1569 
(10th Cir. 1993). As a threshold matter, a plaintiff must show that he possesses a 
constitutionally cognizable liberty or property interest before he can allege an 
unconstitutional deprivation of that interest. Id. To be constitutionally 
cognizable, "the interest must rise to more than an abstract need or desire and 
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must be based on more than a unilateral hope." Ky. Dep 't ofCorr. v. Thompson, 
490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, to 
satisfy the threshold requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate a legitimate claim 
of entitlement to the asserted interest which may arise either from the Due 
Process Clause itself or state law. Id. 
"'A state creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive 
limitations on official discretion.5" Doyle, 998 F.2d at 1569 (quoting Olim v. 
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983)) (alteration omitted). State law, however, 
does not generally create a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest simply "by 
establishing substantive predicates to govern official decision-making"; rather, 
the state must also "mandat[e] the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the 
relevant criteria have been met." Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462 (quotations and 
citations omitted). If state law establishes a substantive predicate without 
mandating an outcome, the law creates nothing more than a right to process which 
is not a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. See Doyle, 998 F.2d at 1570 
("The mere expectation of receiving a state afforded process does not itself create 
an independent liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."). 
Once a procedural due process plaintiff establishes a constitutionally 
cognizable liberty or property interest of which she has been deprived by the 
state, we "examine[] whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were 
constitutionally sufficient." Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460. Although the exact 
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procedures required by the Constitution depend on the circumstances of a given 
case, "[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). 
The Jensens allege procedural due process claims only against Dr. Wagner 
and Ms. Cunningham.4 They base their claim against Dr. Wagner on 
misrepresentations he allegedly made to the juvenile court and to others involved 
with the custody dispute. The Jensens appear to argue that these 
misrepresentations infected the juvenile proceedings to the point that they did not 
afford the Jensens the opportunity to be heard "in a meaningful manner." 
Although we can conceive of circumstances in which false testimony may infect a 
judicial proceeding to the point that the proceeding itself becomes constitutionally 
deficient, c.f. United States v. Vaziri, 164 F.3d 556, 563 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that a criminal conviction obtained by perjured testimony violates 
due process under certain circumstances), the Jensens have not demonstrated that 
any statements by Dr. Wagner had such a degenerative effect on the juvenile 
court proceedings in this case. Accordingly, the Jensens have not met their 
burden of showing that Dr. Wagner violated their procedural due process rights. 
4The Jensens cursorily allege that all defendants made misrepresentations 
that violated their procedural due process rights; however, they make no specific 
factual allegations against Mr. Anderson. Accordingly, we do not read the 
Jensens' opening brief as asserting a procedural due process claim against Mr. 
Anderson. 
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The Jensens base their procedural due process claim against Ms. 
Cunningham on her failure to independently investigate the medical neglect 
allegations made by Dr. Wagner before filing the verified petition in the juvenile 
court. Specifically, the Jensens argue that Utah statutes required Ms. 
Cunningham to interview the Jensens and obtain an independent medical 
examination of P.J. before filing the verified petition. Thus, the Jensens claim a 
constitutionally cognizable liberty interest in an independent investigation by 
DCFS. As discussed above, however, a right to process under state law is not 
itself a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause; rather, state law must 
also mandate a specific outcome upon a finding that certain criteria are met. 
Doyle, 998 F.2d at 1570. The Jensens do not point to any Utah statutes that 
mandate a specific outcome upon completion of the required DCFS investigation 
and a finding that certain criteria are met during that investigation. Accordingly, 
the Jensens fail to establish any constitutionally cognizable liberty interest and 
thus fail to meet the threshold requirement for a procedural due process claim 
against Ms. Cunningham. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Because parental autonomy is fundamental to our democracy and culture 
and a state's interest in protecting the health and safety of minor children is 
compelling, state actors who are responsible for intervening in parental 
relationships must always make difficult decisions that may have constitutional 
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implications. Accordingly, such state actors operate on one of the most delicate 
constitutional barriers in our legal system and their good faith actions to protect 
children must also be protected by our laws. In this case, the Jensens fail to show 
that any defendant violated their clearly established constitutional rights. 
Moreover, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldrnan 
doctrine to consider their claim premised on malicious prosecution. Therefore, 
for the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is REVERSED in part 
and AFFIRMED in part. The defendants' requests for attorneys fees and costs are 
denied. 
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A D D E N D U M B 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
P.J., a minor, by and through his parents and 
natural guardians, BARBARA and DAREN 
JENSEN, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, etaL, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REMANDING 
STATE LAW CLAIMS 
CaseNo.2:05-CV-739TS 
This § 1983 case arises from a protracted dispute between Plaintiffs Daren and Barbara 
Jensen and the State of Utah regarding the proper medical care for their son, Plaintiff P J. 
Currently before the Court are the summary judgment motions of Defendants Richard Anderson, 
Kari Cunningham, Susan Eisenman, Dr. Lars Wagner, and Dr. Karen Albritton. After carefully 
considering the parties' submissions and having heard oral argument, the Court will grant the 
summary judgment motions with regard to the Jensens' § 1983 claims for the reasons discussed 
below. As the Jensens' state law claims involve important issues of Utah law, the Court declines 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and will remand the state claims to the Utah court from 
which they were removed. 
1 
L SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 In considering whether 
genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court determines whether a reasonable jury could return 
a verdict for the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence presented.2 The Court is 
required to construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.3 
II. FACTS 
The following is a summary of the factual background in this case, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the Jensens: On April 30,2003,12-year-old P J. had a small growth removed 
from the floor of his mouth by an oral surgeon named Dr. Chnstensen. The tissue removed by 
Dr. Christensen was sent to Laboratory Corporation of America in Kent, Washington for 
analysis. LabCorp informed Dr. Christensen that the sample was malignant. Dr. Christensen 
then referred P J . to Dr. Harlan Munz at Primary Children's Medical Center ("PCMC") in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
The Jensens met with Dr. Munz on May 9,2003. After examining P J., Dr. Munz 
referred him to PCMC's oncology department where he met with Dr. Wagner. Dr. Wagner first 
]&* Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
2See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924 
F.2d 182,183 (10th Cir. 1991). 
3See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); 
Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991). 
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met with and examined P.J. that same day, but could not offer any diagnosis until after PCMC's 
pathology department completed its own testing. 
Upon PCMC's request, LabCorp sent P.J.'s tissue sample to PCMC's pathology 
department. On May 20,2003, Dr. Lowichik completed the pathology report on P.J.'s tissue, 
diagnosing the growth as "EWING SARCOMA/PERIPHERAL PRIMITIVE 
NEUROECTODERMAL TUMOR''4 (Le.f Ewing's Sarcoma). This diagnosis was rendered 
based on immunohistochemical staining and the appearance of the tumor cells. The pathology 
report indicates that P.J.'s "case was reviewed by [fellow pathologist] [Dr. Coffin] who concurs 
with this interpretation."5 The deposition testimony of the pathologists likewise indicates that 
both of them reviewed the testing and were confident in the diagnosis. Dr. Lowichik estimated 
her confidence in the diagnosis to be "in the high 90 percent."6 Dr. Coffin reviewed the testing 
and was also very confident that the tumor was Ewing's Sarcoma. In fact, Dr. Coffin testified 
that the diagnosis was rendered with near certainty. 
In addition to immunohistochemical staining, Ewing's Sarcoma may be diagnosed 
through cytogenetic and molecular genetic testing. Ewing's cells often manifest a chromosomal 
translocation (an "11;22 translocation"), which may be detected through these tests. The 
presence of an 11 ;22 translocation indicates that a specimen is Ewing's Sarcoma. Cytogenetic 
testing may be performed only on fresh or frozen tissue. Where a tissue sample is placed in 
"Docket No. 345, Ex. 32. 
5Id. 
6Docket No. 334, Ex. 4, at 31. 
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formalin or paraffin, cytogenetic testing is not possible. Although not optimal, molecular testing 
can be performed on tissues samples that have been placed in formalin or paraffin. 
In 2003, PCMC would commonly attempt to conduct cytogenetic testing on sarcoma 
tissue samples that were excised at PCMC where "there was adequate sample left over after the 
standard pathology examination."7 Molecular testing was available through an affiliated 
institution. In 2003, it would not have been unusual for a PCMC pathologist to send samples out 
for molecular testing to provide farther diagnostic information. 
Because the tissue removed from P .J.'s mouth by Dr. Christensen was placed in formalin 
or paraffin, cytogenetic testing could not be performed on that specimen. There were still tumor 
cells in P.J.'s mouth, which could have been extracted for this purpose. However, this would 
have required further surgery to obtain a sample. In contrast, molecular testing could have been 
performed on the tissue sample obtained by Dr. Christensen. 
Dr. Wagner discussed the diagnosis of P J.'s tissue sample with Dr. Coffin, She told him 
that she was confident in the diagnosis and that no further testing was needed. According to Dr. 
Coffin, where the cell appearance and immunohistochemical staining fit "the criteria for the 
diagnosis of Ewing's sarcoma/' it is not necessary to perform cytogenetic or molecular testing to 
establish the diagnosis.8 
On May 21,2003, Dr. Wagner met with the Jensens for more than an hour. Dr. Wagner 
expressed his confidence in the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis and explained the need for 
chemotherapy to begin right away. Dr. Wagner further explained the difference between 
7Docket No. 345, Ex. 15, at 23. 
8Docket No. 334, Ex. 3, at 43-44. 
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localized and non-localized Ewing's Sarcoma. Specifically, Dr. Wagner informed the Jensens 
that the cure rate for localized disease—where there is no evidence of cancer in places other than 
where it was discovered—was approximately 70% when treated with the recommended 
chemotherapy, but that the cure rate for non-localized (metastatic) disease was as low as 20%. 
Thus, Dr. Wagner explained the necessity of beginning treatment right away to prevent the 
cancer from spreading throughout P.J.'s body. 
That same day, radiographic examinations were performed on P J.'s neck, thorax, chest, 
and skull to determine whether the cancer had spread beyond the floor of PJ.'s mouth. Each of 
these tests returned negative. Ms. Jensen testified that at this point they asked Dr. Wagner "if 
there was any other test he could run to help confirm that it was E wing's and he said no."9 uHe 
was sure it was Ewing's,"10 
During the May 21,2003 visit, the Jensens asked Dr. Wagner to have P J.'s tissue sample 
sent to the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute at Harvard University for a second opinion. Dr. Wagner 
informed the Jensens that insurance companies often would not pay for a second opinion and 
encouraged them to contact their insurance provider. Nonetheless, Dr. Wagner agreed to the 
second opinion and sent the tissue sample to Dana-Farber as requested. The Jensens ultimately 
cancelled the Dana-Farber consultation. 
The Jensens met with Dr. Wagner again on May 29, 2003. At this meeting the Jensens 
asked Dr. Wagner to order a Positron Emission Tomography ("PET") scan. Dr. Wagner refused 
to order a PET scan, explaining that it would not be useful in P.J/s situation because there was 
9Docket No. 345, Ex. 12, at 127. 
l0Matl34. 
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no other evidence of metastatic disease. Dr. Wagner further explained to the Jensens that a 
negative PET scan would not change the need for chemotherapy. The Jensens again asked Dr. 
Wagner if there were other tests to confirm the Ewing's diagnosis. Dr. Wagner said no. 
By early June 2003, the Jensens and Dr. Wagner differed significantly in their views 
regarding P.J.'s medical care. Accordingly, a meeting between the Jensens, Dr. Wagner, Dr. 
Lemons (head of the oncology department), a PCMC social worker, and PCMC's head of quality 
assurance was scheduled for June 9,2003, at PCMC. Dr. Wagner again emphasized the need to 
begin treating P. J. with chemotherapy right away in order to prevent the cancer from spreading. 
The Jensens' statements during the meeting are disputed. The Jensens contend that they refused 
to consent to the proposed chemotherapy based on their desire for further confirmatory tests. Dr. 
Wagner contends that they refused chemotherapy because they wanted to pursue an alternative 
treatment called Insulin Potentiation Therapy. Regardless, the parties were unable to resolve the 
impasse. During the meeting, the PCMC head of quality assurance told the Jensens that a 
referral to the Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS") might be necessary. The Jensens 
left the meeting, telling the PCMC representatives, "You're fired."11 
At some point, Dr. Corwin of Safe and Healthy Families—a division of PCMC with the 
responsibility of ensuring that patients are not left untreated—became involved in P.J.'s case. 
Around June 12,2003, Dr. Corwin attempted to make contact with the Jensens. Dr. Corwin and 
Mr. Jensen had a lengthy telephone conversation on June 15,2003, but were unable to reach an 
agreement as to P J.'s medical care. Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen unsuccessfully attempted to 
schedule a further meeting to discuss the situation. At that point, the decision was made to refer 
/<£, Ex. 13, at 181. 
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PJ.'s case to DCFS for medical neglect in refusing what the doctors believed was medically 
necessary treatment. 
On June 16, 2003, a regularly-scheduled meeting was held at PCMC with representatives 
from DCFS, PCMC, and other community organizations in the child welfare system. Dr. 
Wagner and Dr. Corwin were also present. At this meeting, and in a case summary submitted to 
DCFS, Dr. Wagner summarized his interaction with the Jensens. A formal referral to DCFS was 
made that same day. The parties dispute whether it was Dr. Corwin or Dr. Wagner who actually 
submitted the referral. For purposes of the summary judgment motions, the Court must presume 
the latter. 
DCFS assigned PJ.'s case to Ms. Cunningham, a DCFS social worker. Dr. Wagner and 
Dr. Corwin provided Ms. Cunningham with information regarding their understanding of PJ.'s 
situation, both orally and by written case summaries. Ms. Cunningham was also present at the 
June 16,2003 meeting at PCMC. Based on communications with Dr. Wagner, Ms. Cunningham 
was under the impression that PJ.'s situation was a medical emergency and that something 
needed to be done within a matter of hours or days. 
On June 18,2003, Ms. Cunningham, through Assistant Attorney General Lund, filed a 
Verified Petition and Motion to Transfer Custody and Guardianship (the "Verified Petition") in 
the Third District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County, Utah (the "Juvenile Court"). Ms. 
Cunningham filed the Verified Petition based entirely on the information provided to her by Drs. 
Wagner and Corwin. She did not do any independent investigation of PJ.'s referral. 
On June 20,2008, the Jensens first appeared before the Juvenile Court. Ms. Eisenman 
represented DCFS in place of Ms. Lund and became the primary Assistant Attorney General on 
PJ.'s case. At that hearing, the Jensens* attorney, Mr. Frank Mylar, represented that the Jensens 
7 
were interested in obtaining further tests of the tissue sample excised by Dr. Christensen. The 
Court continued the hearing until July 10, 2003, as the parties indicated that a stipulation 
regarding P J.'s treatment was possible. 
Around this time, the Jensens sought out Dr. Birkmayer, who practiced in Vienna, 
Austria. After reviewing P J.'s medical records, Dr. Birkmayer indicated to the Jensens that he 
was not "totally convinced" that P.J. had Ewing's Sarcoma and that chemotherapy was not 
necessary.12 The Jensens expressed their desire to have Dr. Birkmayer supervise P J.'s treatment. 
On July 2,2003, Ms. Eisenman sent an email to Dr. Birkmayer in which she asked questions 
regarding, among other things, Dr. Birkmayer's qualifications and licensure and whether Austria 
had a standard of care similar to that used by the American Academy of Pediatrics. After 
receiving Ms. Eisenman's email from Dr. Birkmayer, Mr. Mylar instructed Ms. Eisenman not to 
contact Dr. Birkmayer directly, but to direct inquiries regarding Dr. Birkmayer to Mr. Mylar. 
According to Mr. Jensen, the Jensens abandoned their desire to have Dr. Birkmayer treat P J. at 
that time because DCFS was requiring that P J.'s medical care be provided by a board-certified 
pediatric oncologist. 
In late June 2003, Dr. Wagner left Utah to pursue a new job in Ohio. He informed Ms. 
Eisenman that he was leaving and that she could contact Dr. Lemons or Dr. Albritton if she 
needed anything. In preparation for the July 10,2003 hearing, Ms. Eisenman disclosed to the 
Juvenile Court that she intended to prove her case using three medical experts: Drs. Coffin, 
Wagner, and Albritton. In preparation for the hearing, Ms. Eisenman provided Dr. Albritton 
12Docket No. 345, Ex. 48. Notably, Plaintiffs represent that they submit Dr. Birkmayer's 
statements only to illustrate the effect they had on the Jensens' mental state and not for the truth 
of the matter asserted. 
8 
with materials related to the case, including Dr. Wagner's case summary and a list of questions 
that might be asked. Mr. Mylar objected to the introduction of testimony at the July 10,2003 
hearing because the hearing was set for a pre-trial conference and not an evidentiary hearing. 
The Juvenile Court affirmed the objection and Drs. Albritton and Coffin did not testify at that 
time. 
At the July 10,2003 hearing, the Jensens again raised the issue of whether P J. really had 
Ewing's Sarcoma, The parties stipulated that the Jensens would have P J. examined by doctors 
at the Children's Hospital of Los Angeles ("CHLA") and that the Jensens would abide by their 
treatment recommendations. The Juvenile Court set another pretrial conference for July 28, 
2003. Per the stipulation, the Jensens traveled to Los Angeles, where P J. met with Dr. Tishler 
on July 21, 2003. At this meeting, Dr. Tishler informed the Jensens that he was recommending 
chemotherapy based on the prior pathology tests, but that CHLA would do its own pathology 
analysis and genetic testing to confirm the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis. The Jensens were 
unhappy with this result as they believed that Dr. Tishler was not performing an independent 
evaluation, but was merely deferring to the PCMC doctors. 
Based on this dissatisfaction, the Jensens did not return again to CHLA, but instead 
sought medical care from Dr. Charles Simone. Dr. Simone initially agreed to treat P.J. 
However, upon learning of the legal battle in which the Jensens were entrenched, Dr. Simone 
declined involvement. Nonetheless, the Jensens believed that Dr. Simone would still agree to 
treat P. J. if the Juvenile Court would permit it. 
At the hearing on July 28, 2003, the Juvenile Court received a report from Dr. Tishler via 
telephone regarding P.J.'s evaluation at CHLA. Dr. Tishler indicated that to his knowledge the 
CHLA testing was not yet complete. However, he also stated that there was no question that P.J. 
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had a malignant tumor that would require chemotherapy right away and that the remaining 
pathological and radiological tests would serve only to clarify what type of tumor he had for 
purposes of tailoring the chemotherapy to PJ. 's needs. The Jensens' new attorney, Mr, Blake 
Nakamura, advocated the Jensens' concern that not all of the testing had been completed. 
Nonetheless, based on Dr. Tishler's testimony, the Juvenile Court ordered that P J. commence 
chemotherapy before August 8,2003, without regard to the CHLA test results. The Juvenile 
Court also provided that should the test results indicate that chemotherapy was not needed, the 
Jensens were free to bring that fact to the Juvenile Court's attention. 
Mr. Nakamura also represented to the Juvenile Court at the July 28 hearing that the 
Jensens were not comfortable with Dr. Tishler and would prefer that P J. be treated by Dr. 
Simone. During the hearing, the Juvenile Court asked Dr. Albritton whether Dr. Simone could 
be the primary treating physician. Dr. Albritton answered: 
No, we wouldn't make him the primary oncologist. My understanding, in fact, is 
that he is not board certified in oncology, either pediatric or medical oncology. 
He's - from what little I know, he's a specialist in complimentary and alternative 
medicine. So the gist I get is that he would be asking someone either in Utah or 
LA. to be prescribing the chemotherapy and then he would be suggesting the 
complimentary approaches that might diminish side effects and so on. I do not 
think there will be an oncologist in Utah or L.A. who would let him prescribe the 
chemotherapy from New Jersey.13 
The Juvenile Court also asked Dr. Tishler whether P J.'s primary treating physician 
needed to be a board certified oncologist. Dr. Tishler answered: "Definitely. There's no other 
physician that could lead the care and provide the care."14 Based on this, the Juvenile Court 
ordered that PJ. 's primary treating physician be a board certified pediatric oncologist or 
l3DocketNo. 334, Ex. 33-C, 50-51. 
uId. at 53-54. 
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hematologist, but that Dr. Simone was authorized to work with P J.'s other treating physicians. 
The Court also scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Verified Petition for August 20, 2003, in 
the event PJ/s situation was not yet resolved. 
The Jensens never returned to CHLA or PCMC to receive the ordered chemotherapy for 
P J. Instead, they sought evaluation at the Burzynski Clinic in Houston, Texas. Around August 
6,2003, the Jensens contacted the Burzynski Clinic to inquiry whether it could treat P.J. On 
August 7,2003, an employee of the Burzynski Clinic called the Jensens to indicate that the 
Clinic was willing to see him. Accordingly, an appointment was set for August 12,2003. 
At this point, the Jensens apparently believed that they did not have to comply with the 
Juvenile Court's order to begin chemotherapy by August 8,2003, and that this would only result 
in the Juvenile Court's holding the August 20,2003 evidentiary hearing on the Verified Petition. 
Thus, on August 8,2003, the Jensens took P.J. and the rest of their children to Bear Lake in 
Idaho to go boating. From Idaho, they planned to travel to Houston for P.J. to be evaluated at the 
Burzynski Clinic on August 12. 
Having not received confirmation that P J.'s chemotherapy was underway, Ms. Eisenman 
sought a hearing with the Juvenile Court on August 8,2003, for the purpose of seeking 
authorization to take P.J. into protective custody. Ms. Eisenman called Mr. Nakamura to notify 
him of her intent to obtain a protective custody order. Present at the August 8, 2003 hearing 
were Ms. Eisenman, Ms. Cunningham, PJ.'s guardian ad litem, and Mr. Nakamura. Mr. 
Nakamura participated in the August 8 hearmg by telephone. Mr. Nakamura indicated that P J. 
was not receiving chemotherapy, that the Jensens did not want to initiate chemotherapy, and that 
they were taking P.J. to the Burzynski Clinic for evaluation. In response to the disclosure of the 
Jensens' intent to seek evaluation at the Burzynski Clinic, Ms. Cunningham paged Dr. Albritton, 
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who then participated in the hearing by telephone. The Juvenile Court and counsel asked Dr. 
Albritton whether the Burzynski Clinic was qualified to provide P J.'s treatment. Dr. Albritton 
indicated that Dr. Burzynski was not a board certified oncologist-hematologist and that his clinic 
is known for providing extremely controversial therapy. Dr. Albritton further indicated that she 
was unaware of any pediatric oncologists at the Burzynski Clinic, but would need more time to 
confirm that fact. Finally, Dr. Albritton testified that the Burzynski Clinic was not an 
appropriate option for a newly-diagnosed cancer patient who had not exhausted standard 
treatment options. 
Ms. Eisenman then filed an Application to Take a Child Into Protective Custody. This 
application was supported by an affidavit signed by Ms. Cunningham on August 8, 2003. 
Attached to Ms. Cunningham's affidavit was an affidavit executed by Dr. Wagner on July 22, 
2003. The Juvenile Court signed an order authorizing DCFS to take PJ. into protective custody, 
finding that it was in P J.'s best interest. Ms. Eisenman enlisted the help of Sandy City Police 
Officer Peterson, whom she had contacted earlier that day, to help serve the warrant. Officer 
Peterson was unable to serve the warrant because the Jensens had already left for Bear Lake 
earlier that day. 
Mr. Nakamura infonned the Jensens that the Juvenile Court had signed a "pickup order" 
and that PJ. was to be placed in DCFS custody to begin chemotherapy. Despite this, the Jensens 
decided to stay in Idaho and seek an independent opinion of P J.'s condition in preparation for 
the evidentiary hearing scheduled for August 20,2003. 
On August 13,2003, PJ.'s guardian ad litem filed a motion for an order to show cause. 
After hearing the motion that same day, the Juvenile Court entered a bench warrant for the 
Jensens' arrest and ordered them to appear and present P J. However, a Juvenile Court clerk told 
12 
Ms. Eisemnan and PJ.'s guardian ad litem that a Juvenile Court warrant would not be placed on 
a national database, which would require an adult warrant. Perhaps recognizing this, Ms. 
Eisemnan announced to the Jensens' attorneys and PJ.'s guardian ad litem that if the Jensens did 
not cooperate with the Juvenile Court orders, she would have to go to local and federal law 
enforcement authorities. 
Based on information provided by Ms. Eisemnan to Officer Peterson, the Salt Lake 
County District Attorney's Office agreed to screen the Jensen matter for criminal charges on 
August 15,2003. Ms. Eisemnan, Ms. Cunningham, and PJ.'s guardian ad litem attended the 
August 15 screening. That same day, the District Attorney's Office filed criminal charges 
against the Jensens, including one count of custodial interference and one count of kidnaping. 
On August 16,2003, Mr. Jensen was arrested in Idaho where he spent four days in jail 
before he was released on bail. Upon Mr. Jensen's arrest, Ms. Jensen left Idaho and took P J. to 
Houston in an attempt to meet with the Burzynski Clinic. However, the Burzynski Clinic refused 
to see P J. because Ms. Eisemnan and PJ.'s guardian ad litem informed the clinic that the State 
had been granted protective custody over P J. and did not consent to his treatment. 
The Juvenile Court held a non-evidentiary hearing on August 20,2003. In that hearing, 
Mr. Nakamura read a letter written by Mr. Jensen and explained that the Jensens wished to have 
an opportunity to present evidence. The Juvenile Court agreed to set an evidentiary hearing, but 
refused to lift the warrants. 
Shortly after this hearing, Ms. Eisemnan assumed a new position in the Attorney 
General's Office and no longer participated in PJ.'s case. Additionally, Mr. Anderson, Director 
of DCFS, was asked by a representative of Utah's Governor to personally assist in negotiating a 
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resolution to PJ.'s case. Accordingly, on August 27, 2003, Mr. Anderson flew to Idaho to meet 
with the Jensens where negotiations continued for several days. 
On September 5,2003, the parties entered into a stipulation in which the Jensens agreed 
to submit P.J. to the care of Dr. Johnston—a board-certified pediatric oncologist—of St. Luke's 
Hospital in Boise, Idaho, and to abide by his treatment recommendations. DCFS agreed to ask 
the Juvenile Court to return full custody of P J. to the Jensens and to vacate the warrants. After 
receiving assurances that the Jensens would submit to chemotherapy if Dr. Johnston 
recommended it, the Juvenile Court approved the stipulation. 
After performing his evaluation, Dr. Johnston concluded that P J. needed chemotherapy. 
The Jensens again refused to submit P.J. to chemotherapy, claiming that Dr. Johnston was 
merely rubber-stamping the diagnosis of the PCMC doctors. Mr. Jensen told Dr. Johnston that if 
P.J. ever did receive chemotherapy at St. Luke's, he would "make sure it's a hellish experience 
for everybody involved."15 
Another hearing was held in the Juvenile Court on October 8,2003. At the October 8 
hearing, Dr. Johnston testified that he had confirmed P J. had Ewing's Sarcoma and that the 
Jensens had rejected his recommendation that P J. undergo chemotherapy. Assistant Attorney 
General Mark May, who replaced Ms. Eisenman on PJ.'s case, indicated that the parties would 
attempt to reach a settlement. 
Having determined that the Jensens would not submit P.J. to chemotherapy under any 
circumstances, DCFS filed a Motion to Dismiss Verified Petition on October 22, 2003. In its 
Motion, DCFS stated that its decision to dismiss the Verified Petition was made with full 
l5DocketNo. 344, Ex. 11, at 700-01. 
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recognition that without chemotherapy P J.'s chances of survival would fall dramatically. 
Nonetheless, DCFS concluded that it was simply unworkable to attempt to force a 13-year-old 
boy to undergo chemotherapy unwillingly. 
On October 2,2003, the Jensens entered a plea agreement with the State on the criminal 
charges. The Jensens agreed to enter a guilty plea and abeyance on the custodial interference 
charge in exchange for the State's promise to dismiss the kidnaping charge. 
HI. DISCUSSION 
In July 2005, the Jensens filed a Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt 
Lake County, Utah, against the State of Utah, Intermountain Health Care, Inc., Ms. Cunningham, 
Mr. Anderson, Dr. Wagner, Dr. Corwin, Dr. Coffin, Dr. Albritton, and Ms. Eisenman. In their 
Complaint, the Jensens allege the following causes of action: (1) § 1983 - violation of the 
substantive due process right to direct medical care (2) § 1983 - violation of the substantive due 
process right to familial association;16 (3) § 1983 - malicious prosecution under the Fourth 
16In their Complaint, the Jensens allege that Defendants violated their right to familial 
association under both the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, in the Tenth Circuit "the familial right of association is properly based 
on the 'concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment/" Griffen v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 
1547 (10th Cir. 1993). The Court recognizes that the Tenth Circuit has, in dictum, recognized a 
First Amendment right "to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private relationships." 
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 358 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(dealing with expressive association). Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit has consistently analyzed 
familial association claims within the substantive due process framework, even in cases decided 
subsequent to the Grace United Methodist Church case. See Estate of Herring v. City of 
Colorado Springs, 233 Fed. Appx. 854, 856 (10th Cir. May 18, 2007) (recognizing that "the 
familial right of association is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment concept of liberty") 
(unpublished decision); Suasnavas v. Stover, 196 Fed. Appx. 647, 654 (10th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006) 
("The right of familial association is a substantive due process right. . . .") (unpublished 
decision); Chatwin v. Barlow, 2008 WL 501109, at *4 (D. Utah Feb. 20, 2008) ("The Tenth 
Circuit has recognized that the freedom of familial association is a substantive right guaranteed 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (unpublished decision). Based on the 
long line of cases employing the standards set forth in Giiffen, the Court finds that the Jensens' 
15 
Amendment; (4) § 1983 - violation of the Ninth Amendment; (5) violation of article I, section 1 
of the Utah Constitution; (6) violation of article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution; (7) 
violation of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution; (8) violation of article I, section 25 of 
the Utah Constitution; (9) wrongful initiation; and (10) intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
After removing the case to this Court, the Defendants filed motions to dismiss. In an 
Order dated June 16,2006, the Court dismissed the State of Utah on the basis of sovereign 
immunity and Drs. Corwin and Coffin on the basis of absolute immunity. The Court also 
dismissed the fourth and eighth causes of action in their entirety and the first and third causes of 
action to the extent they were asserted by P.J. IHC has since been voluntarily dismissed. 
After the close of discovery on the issue of liability, Mr. Anderson, Ms. Cunningham, 
Ms. Eisenman, Dr. Wagner, and Dr. Albritton filed the motions presently before the Court, 
arguing that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs5 federal claims based on the 
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, absolute immunity, and qualified immunity. 
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 
"Rooker-Feldman precludes federal district courts from effectively exercising appellate 
jurisdiction over claims 'actually decided by a state court' and claims 'inextricably intertwined' 
with a prior state-court judgment."17 The doctrine arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), which allows 
familial association claims arise from and are appropriately analyzed under Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
vlMo's Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Or. 2006) (quoting Penmen 
Eng'g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468,473 (10th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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review of state-court judgments by the United States Supreme Court and, by negative inference, 
precludes lower federal courts from exercising such jurisdiction.18 
Noting that the doctrine had, at times, been applied by lower courts far beyond its original 
contours, the Supreme Court declared in the case of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries 
Corp.,19 that application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to "cases brought by state-
court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district 
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments."20 The Tenth Circuit summarized the Exxon Mobil holding as follows: 
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Exxon Mobile the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
does not apply "simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a 
matter previously litigated in state court." To the contrary, a party may lose in 
state court and then raise precisely the same legal issues in federal court, so long 
as the relief sought in the federal action would not reverse or undo the relief 
granted by the state court: "if a federal plaintiff 'presents] some independent 
claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a 
case to which he was a party . . . , then there is jurisdiction "'21 
Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman applies only where the relief sought in the federal case would 
"reverse or undo the state court judgment."22 
Rooker-Feldman has been applied to constitutional claims arising from child custody 
proceedings in state courts. For example, in Wamick v. Briggs,23 this Court applied the doctrine 
itid. 
19544 U.S. 280 (2005). 
20Mat284. 
2lMo 's Express, 441 F.3d at 1237 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292-94). 
nId. 
^2007 WL 3231609 (D. Utah Oct. 30,2007). 
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to a § 1983 claim alleging various constitutional violations against several state actors, seeking 
review of the circumstances surrounding the removal of the plaintiffs child by the state without 
a pre-removal hearing.24 The Court found that "if it adjudicated Plaintiffs' claims relating to [the 
child's] removal, [it] would effectively act as an appellate court in reviewing the juvenile court's 
disposition."25 Applying Rooker-Feldman in that situation made sense as the juvenile court 
heard and decided the issue of whether the circumstances justified the child's removal, and the 
plaintiff did not challenge the "integrity of the evidence" before the juvenile court.26 
However, where a plaintiffs federal cause of action is for injury sustained as a result of 
actions taken during the course of the custody proceedings that are separate from the judgments 
of the state court, Rooker-Feldman does not apply. The case of Brokaw v. Weaver17 of the 
Seventh Circuit is particularly persuasive on this point and is closely analogous to the Jensens' 
case. In Brokaw, the plaintiff was removed from her parents and placed in state custody by order 
of a state court after a social worker and others fabricated a charge of child neglect.28 
Subsequently, another state court found no continuing basis to hold the plaintiff in state custody 
and released her to her parents.29 Years later, after reaching the age of majority, the plaintiff 




27305 F.3d 660 (7th Or. 2002). 
1%ld at 662. 
"Id. at 663. 
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charges, alleging violations of her right to familial relations under substantive due process, 
violation of the Fourth Amendment in her removal, and violation of procedural due process.30 
The district court dismissed the case based on application of the Rooker-Feldrnan doctrine. 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the actions of the defendants "violated her 
constitutional rights, independently of the state court decision."31 The court recognized that the 
plaintiff's injuries would not have happened without the state court's order directing her removal 
and placing her in state custody. Nonetheless, the court found that the plaintiffs claims were 
independent of the state court judgments, emphasizing that even if the plaintiff "would not have 
suffered any damages absent the state order . . . her claim for damages [was] based on an alleged 
independent violation of her constitutional rights. It was this separate constitutional violation 
which caused the adverse state court decision."32 Thus, the true cause of the plaintiffs injuries 
was the defendant's actions, even though the injuries would not have occurred absent the state 
court's order.33 
In this case, the Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to the 
Jensens' claims, as they seek relief independent from any judgements rendered by the state 
courts. The Jensens do not seek to reverse or undo any judgments of the state courts. After all, 
the Verified Petition was ultimately dismissed and full custody of P.J. returned to the Jensens. 
37rf. at 665. 
zlId. at 667; see also Holloway v. Borsh, 220 F.3d 767, 778-79 (6th Cir, 2000) (finding § 
1983 suit against caseworker independent of state custody proceedings based on actions taken by 
the caseworker during the course of the state proceedings). 
335rotew,305F.3dat667. 
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Rather, the Jensens' claims are based on the separate conduct of the Defendants previous to and 
during the course of the proceedings in the state courts. Although the Juvenile Coxirt was surely 
called upon to balance the parental rights of the Jensens with the State's interest in protecting 
PJ.'s welfare, nothing in the record indicates that either the Juvenile Court or the state criminal 
court heard and ruled on claims that the Defendants deliberately misrepresented and omitted 
material facts to the state courts, to each other, to the District Attorney's Office, or others 
involved in the events surrounding PJ.'s medical care in 2003. 
Thus, the Jensens allege independent claims similar to those in the Brokaw case. 
Although much of the injury alleged by the Jensens would not have resulted in the absence of the 
Juvenile Court's orders, the Jensens argue that the underlying cause of those orders was the 
Defendants' factual misrepresentations and omissions. The Jensens' claims are different from 
those in the Warnick case, where the state court entered specific findings of fact on the very 
events complained of by the plaintiffs and where there was no challenge to the integrity of the 
evidence. It is true that granting relief to the Jensens in this case might require the Court to enter 
findings that contradict issues decided by the state court. However, this does not, of itself, 
invoke the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.34 Thus, the constitutional injury alleged by the Jensens is 
separate and independent from any orders of the state courts, precluding application of the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
It must be noted, however, that the Jensens' claims are properly before this Court only to 
the extent that they allege the Defendants engaged in conduct that was not brought before the 
Juvenile Court or conduct that materially affected the integrity of the evidence on which the 
3AMo 's Express, 441 F.3d at 1237. 
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Juvenile Court relied. It is not for this Court to decide whether P J. actually had Ewing's 
Sarcoma or whether the Juvenile Court properly balanced the State's interest in protecting 
children and the Jensens' constitutional rights. Those issues, and other similar matters, were 
squarely ruled on by the Juvenile Court and could only be properly challenged by the Jensens 
through an appeal. 
B. Absolute Immunity 
"The Supreme Court has recognized the defense of absolute immunity from civil rights 
suits in several well-established contexts involving the judicial process/535 "[S]tate attorneys and 
agency officials who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor in initiating and 
pursuing civil and administrative enforcement proceedings are absolutely immune from suit 
under section 1983 concerning activities intimately associated with the judicial... process."36 
The Tenth Circuit has recognized that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when they 
;meet this criteria.37 
The Court applies a "functional approach" to determine whether activities are sufficiently 
connected with the judicial process to merit absolute immunity,38 A prosecutor is entitled to 
absolute prosecutorial immunity "when performing the traditional functions of an advocate."39 
Thus, a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity even when he or she is accused of making 
$5Snell v. Tunnell 920 F.2d 673, 686 (10th Cir. 1990). 
36Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 908 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pfeijfer v. Hartford Fire Ins, 
Co., 929 F.2d 1484,1490 (10th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
37Snell, 920 F.2d at 687-91 (quoting Imbler v. Packman, 424 U.S. 409,430 (1976)). 
38/<£at686. 
29Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997). 
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misrepresentations to the court, as long as the actions were taken in the role of an advocate.40 
"However, absolute immunity does not extend to actions 'that are primarily investigative or 
administrative in nature,' though it 'may attach even to such administrative or investigative 
activities when these functions are necessary so that a prosecutor may fulfill his function as an 
officer of the court/"41 
As a general rule, witnesses who testify in a judicial proceeding, whether during trial or 
before, are likewise entitled to absolute immunity from suit arising from their testimony.42 
However, absolute witness immunity is not available to "complaining witnesses'*—"the person 
(or persons) who actively instigated or encouraged the prosecution of the plaintiff—for 
testimony "that is relevant to the manner in which the complaining witness initiated or 
perpetuated the prosecution."43 
As explained below, the Court finds that Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton are absolutely 
immune from all of the Jensens' § 1983 claims. Ms. Cunningham is likewise entitled to absolute 
immunity with regard to her decision to file the Verified Petition, but is not so entitled with 
regard to the rest of the conduct alleged in the Jensens' Complaint. 
Ms. Eisenman. Ms. Eisenman argues that she is absolutely immune from the Jensens' 
claims arising from functions performed in her role as an advocate or in fulfillment of her duties 
as an officer of the Juvenile Court. The Jensens claim that Ms. Eisenman engaged in a number 
40Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 & n.34. 
43Scott, 216 F.3d at 908 (quoting Pfeiffer, 929 F.2d at 1490) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
A1
 Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395,1400 (10th Cir. 1992). 
4lW. at 1399 n.2,1402. 
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of harmful activities outside the scope of her advocate role, which are grouped as follows for 
purposes of analysis; (1) factual misrepresentations and omissions made to the Juvenile Court; 
(2) misrepresentations to Ms. Cunningham, Mr. Anderson, and Utah Attorney General 
Shurtleff;44 (3) factual misrepresentations and omissions made to the District Attorney's Office; 
and (4) other investigative activities. Additionally, although not discussed by the Jensens, Ms. 
Eisenman contends that she is immune from claims arising from the August 2003 letter to the 
Burzynski Clinic in which Ms. Eisenman informed the Clinic of the custody order and forbade 
the clinic from providing any treatment to P J. The Court finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to 
absolute immunity with respect to all of the Jensens § 1983 claims. 
Ms. Eisenman is absolutely immune with regard to the first group—misrepresentations 
made to the Juvenile Court. Even assuming that Ms. Eisenman intentionally misrepresented 
facts to the Juvenile Court, those misrepresentations were made in her role as an advocate. There 
is no evidence that any of the alleged misrepresentations were made under oath or as a witness. 
The Court likewise finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with regard 
to the second group—misrepresentations to others involved in the Juvenile Court proceedings. 
Ms. Eisenman's communications with these persons were all directly related to the Juvenile 
Court proceedings. Ms. Cunningham and Mr. Anderson from DCFS were Ms. Eisenman's 
clients. Attorney General Shurtleff was Ms. Eisenman's co-prosecutor, whose name was on the 
Juvenile Court pleadings. The parties have not cited, nor has additional research uncovered, any 
cases dealing with the question of whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for 
communications with her clients and co-counsel. Nonetheless, these communications are 
44The Jensens also claim that a misrepresentation was made to the Guardian ad Litem, but 
offer no citation to evidence that would support this assertion. 
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directly related to a prosecutor's ability to present the State's case, satisfying the guiding 
principle of prosecutorial immunity—proximity to the "judicial process and the initiation and 
presentation of the state's case/'45 A prosecutor must be able to freely speak with her client—the 
very person for whom he is advocating—and the other prosecutors assigned to the case without 
fear that their communications may later form the basis of a civil suit. These communications 
likely include discussions of, among other things, trial preparation and strategy, discussion of 
applicable law, as well as plea and settlement opportunities. Allowing claims to proceed against 
a prosecutor based on information shared (or not shared) during the course of discussions with 
his client and/or his fellow prosecutor would interfere with the prosecutor's ability to present the 
State's case.46 Thus, the public policy behind the prosecutorial privilege—"to allow 
functionaries in the judicial system the latitude to perform their tasks absent the threat of 
retaliatory litigation"47—fully supports Ms. Eisenman's entitlement to absolute immunity with 
regard to her communications with Ms. Cunningham, Mr. Anderson, and Attorney General 
Shurtleff. 
The Court also finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with regard to 
the third category—misrepresentations made to the District Attorney. The Jensens have 
submitted sufficient evidence to show that Ms. Eisenman provided the District Attorney's Office 
with factual information that led to the criminal charges against the Jensens. In the absence of 
other considerations, this would render Ms. Eisenman a complaining witness, absolving her of 
45&x>tf,216F.3dat908. 
46Id. 
"Snell, 920 F.2d at 686-87. 
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prosecutorial immunity with regard to the criminal case.4 However, the Juvenile Court had 
ordered that DCFS take protective custody of P J. Despite being apprised by their attorney of the 
Juvenile Court's custody order, the Jensens refused to return to Utah and produce P J. Seeking to 
effectuate the Juvenile Court's order, Ms. Eisenman provided information to the District 
Attorney's office which led to the initiation of criminal charges. It is clear to this Court that 
these actions were intimately connected with her duties to the Juvenile Court.49 For these same 
reasons, Ms. Eisenman's actions in drafting and sending the August 2003 letter to the Bur2ynski 
Clinic were also intimately connected with the Juvenile Court proceedings. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with respect to the Jensens' 
claims related to her providing allegedly misleading information to the District Attorney's Office 
and to her drafting and sending the August 2003 letter to the Burzynski Clinic. 
With regard to the fourth grouping—investigative activities—the Jensens point to two 
examples of investigative activities engaged in by Ms. Eisenman: (1) providing documents to Dr. 
Albritton in advance of a July 10,2003 hearing; and (2) sending an email to Dr. Birkmayer in 
which she made false representations regarding the standard of care for Ewing's Sarcoma 
treatment Concerning the former, the Jensens do not show how providing documents to a 
witness in the course of preparing for a hearing is investigative. With respect to the latter, the 
Jensens offer the following evidence in support of their assertion that Ms. Eisenman discovered 
the standard mentioned in the email to Dr. Birkmayer through her own investigative efforts: (1) 
48i^/ma,522U.S. at 129-31. 
A9Cf. Burrows v. Cherokee County Sheriff's Office, 38 Fed. Appx. 504, 506 (10th Cir. 
Mar. 19,2002) (granting immunity to prosecutor for his actions in seeking extradition order) 
(unpublished decision). 
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Ms. Eisenman testified that she could not remember where she got the document containing the 
referenced standard; (2) that Dr. Wagner testified that he did not give it to her; and (3) that P J.'s 
guardian ad litem did not recognize the document. Even when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the Jensens, this testimony does not permit an inference that Ms. Eisenman obtained the 
document through her own investigative efforts. A number of doctors participated in DCFS's 
involvement with P J.'s situation—including Drs. Lemons and Albritton, both pediatric 
oncologists—any one of whom might have provided this information to Ms. Eisenman. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that Ms. Eisenman is absolutely immune from these claims, 
which are directly related to Ms. Eisenman's efforts to marshal the evidence and prepare for 
witness examination. 
Dr. Albritton. The Jensens* claims against Dr. Albritton are based on the following 
allegations'. (1) that Dr. Albritton stated to Ms. Eisenman, Ms. McDonald, and the Juvenile Court 
that only a board-certified pediatric oncologist was qualified to treat P.J.; (2) that Dr. Albritton 
misrepresented the qualifications and services of the Burzynski Clinic to the Juvenile Court; and 
(3) that Dr. Albritton failed to disclose to the Juvenile Court and others that genetic testing was 
routinely conducted at PCMC on cases of suspected Ewing's Sarcoma.50 Each of these 
allegations are directly tied to Dr. Albritton's role as an expert witness in which she opined as to 
the medical care required by P.J. and what doctors and facilities were capable of providing it. 
50In opposing absolute immunity, the Jensens also point to circumstantial evidence that 
they claims shows Dr. Albritton provided false information to Dr. Johnston. The Jensens argue 
that this makes Dr. Albritton a complaining witness. However, nowhere in their briefs do the 
Jensens rely on this evidence to support their constitutional claims. The Jensens make no effort 
to show how Dr. Albritton's alleged conversation with Dr. Johnston violated their constitutional 
rights. 
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This was precisely what Dr. Albritton was subpoenaed to testify about. Accordingly, the Court 
finds that Dr. Albritton is entitled to absolute immunity from the Jensens5 § 1983 claims. 
Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens base their § 1983 claims against Ms. Cunningham on her 
failure to investigate P.J.'s referral before filing the Verified Petition and on the factual 
misrepresentations she allegedly made to the Juvenile Court. Ms. Cunningham contends that she 
is absolutely immune from each of the claims asserted by the Jensens because she performed 
only prosecutorial functions. 
The Court finds that Ms. Cunningham is entitled to absolute immunity, but only with 
regard to her decision to file the Verified Petition. The Verified Petition was filed with an 
accompanying "Verification" in which Ms. Cunningham swore under oath that the "matters 
stated [in the Petition] are true."51 Although Ms. Cunningham surely exercised prosecutorial 
discretion in electing to file the petition, she acted outside the scope of any prosecutorial function 
by attesting under oath to the allegations in the Verified Petition as a complaining witness/2 
Thus, although Ms. Cunningham is entitled to absolute immunity for her decision to file the 
Verified Petition, she is not immune from the Jensens' claims based their contention that the 
Verified Petition contained misrepresentations and omissions. For the same reasons, Ms. 
Cunningham is not immune from the Jensen's claims arising from the submission of her August 
2003 affidavits, which the Jensens claim contained factual misrepresentations and omissions. 
Finally, Ms. Cunningham is not absolutely immune from the Jensens* claims arising from 
her alleged failure to properly investigate P.J.'s referral because this duty did not sufficiently 
51
 Verified Petition, Docket No. 345, Ex. 43, at 6. 
S2Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-31. 
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relate to the judicial proceedings. Certainly, prosecutorial immunity may be had for actions in 
"obtaining, reviewing and evaluating evidence" prior to initiation of a criminal action.53 
However, this is because these investigative actions "are necessary so that a prosecutor may 
fulfill his function as an officer of the court."54 Although a judicial proceeding might result from 
its fulfillment, Ms. Cunningham's duty to investigate reports of child neglect is for the purpose 
of protecting the children who are the subject of those reports.55 Therefore, it cannot be said that 
fulfillment of this duty is intimately associated with the judicial process. Accordingly, the Court 
will deny Ms. Cunningham's request for summary judgment based on absolute immunity. 
C. Qualified Immunity 
Each of the Defendants also asserts qualified immunity with respect to the Jensens' § 
1983 claims. Where a state actor raises a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary 
judgment, "the burden shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy a strict two-part test: first, the plaintiff must 
show that the defendant's actions violated a constitutional or statutory right; second, the plaintiff 
must show that this right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue."56 "If, and 
only if, the plaintiff meets this two-part test does a defendant then bear the traditional burden of 
the movant for summary judgment—showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."57 
53Snell 920 F.2d at 693. 
54/d 
55Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-409. 
%Clarkv. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219, 1222 (!0th Cir. 2008) (quotingNelson v. McMullen, 
207 F3d 1202,1205 (10th Cir. 2000). 
S1ld. 
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A right is clearly established where "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his 
conduct was unlawful in the situation."58 This determination must be made "in light of the 
specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition."59 That a right was clearly 
established can be shown by controlling case law in the Tenth Circuit or by the weight of 
authority in other circuits.60 Notably, though, the Supreme Court has held that "officials can still 
be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances/'61 
In their § 1983 claims, the Jensens allege that Defendants violated their substantive due 
process rights and their rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
1. Substantive Due Process 
In their first and second causes of action, the Jensens62 claim that each of the Defendants 
engaged in substantive due process violations of the Jensens' rights to familial association and to 
direct PJ.'s medical care. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not "deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law."63 In addition to procedural protections, the Due 
Process Clause also provides two forms of "substantive" protection: (1) protection against 
nCortez v. McCauley, 478 F3d 1108, 1114 (1 Oth Or. 2007) (quoting Saucier v Katz, 
533 U.S. 194,202(2001)). 
*>/<£ (quoting Katz, 533 U.S. at 201). 
60M at 1114-15. 
6lId. at 1115 (quoting Hope v. Peizer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)), 
62In its June 2006 Order, the Court dismissed PJ. 's claims for violation of his right to 
refuse unwanted treatment. Thus, P J. proceeds only on his familial association claim. 
63U.S. Const Amend. XIV § L 
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government action that "shocks the conscience" and (2) protection of fundamental liberty 
interests.64 In the case of Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, the Tenth Circuit recently clarified that 
these two "strands of the substantive due process doctrine" are not mutually exclusive.65 Rather, 
"by satisfying either the 'fundamental right' or the 'shocks the conscience' standards, a plaintiff 
states a valid substantive due process claim."66 The Seegmiller court admonished: "Courts 
should not unilaterally choose to consider only one or the other of the two strands. Both 
approaches may well be applied in any given case."67 
A substantive due process claim based on arbitrary and oppressive government action is 
established where the conduct in question is so egregious that it "shocks the conscience of 
federal judges."68 Mere negligence is clearly insufficient to meet this standard69 For that matter, 
even an intentional or reckless abuse of power that causes the plaintiff injury does not, of itself, 
meet the "shocks the conscience" standard.70 Rather, there must be "a degree of outrageousness 
and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking."71 
"Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2008). 
65Id at 767, 769. 
"Id. at 767. 
61
 Id. at 769. 
mWardv. Anderson, 494 F.3d 929, 938 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Moore v. Guthrie, 438 
F.3d 1036,1040 (10th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
69/<f.at937. 
70Id. at 937-38. 
71Id. at 938. 
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A substantive due process plaintiff asserting a fundamental liberty interest must narrowly 
articulate its scope.72 The Court must then determine whether the asserted interest is 
"objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."73 Should 
both of these hurdles be cleared, the plaintiff must then show that the government actor's conduct 
infringed on the plaintiffs fundamental liberty interest and was "not narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest."74 
The Jensens claim that Defendants infringed on their right to direct PJ.'s medical care 
and their right to familial association. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Due Process 
Clause "protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, 
and control of their children."75 This "fundamental right" encompasses both of the liberty 
interests asserted by the Jensens, calling for application of the compelling interest/narrowly 
tailored standard. InDubbs v. Head Start, Inc.,16 the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court for 
applying the "shocks the conscience" standard to the substantive due process claims of two 
parents against the state for infringing on their right to direct the medical care of their children.77 
72Seegmiller, 528 F3d at 769 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,721 
(1997)). 
72Id (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760,775-76 (2003)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
74Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 767. 
7STroxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
76336 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2003). 
77Id. at 1202-03. 
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Although it ultimately declined to delineate the applicable standard due to the scant record before 
it, the court included a parent's right to direct the medical care of his or her children among those 
fundamental rights for which a substantive due process claim may be stated without meeting the 
"shocks the conscience" standard.78 
Dr. Wagner contends that the Jensens have not narrowly articulated their right to direct 
P J. 's medical care and, therefore, are not entitled to application of the compelling 
interest/narrowly tailored standard. More specifically, Dr. Wagner argues that the Jensens' claim 
to absolute autonomy in directing the medical care decisions of their son conflicts with the 
'"Constitution's notions of ordered liberty/ which have always protected a child's right to 
treatment whenever it has been unreasonably denied by a parent."79 The Court agrees with this 
general proposition. However, with a few notable exceptions that are discussed below, the Court 
does not read the Jensens' claimed right so broadly. The Jensens do not claim a right to direct 
P.J.'s medical care free of any State interference. Rather, they claim that the State cannot 
interfere with their right to direct P.J.'s medical care by making deliberate and material factual 
misrepresentations and omissions to state courts and other decision makers during the process by 
which that interference is accomplished. As the Court recognized in its June 2006 Order, when 
the Jensens' right to direct P J.'s medical care is placed in this context, it is not only fundamental, 
but is also clearly established.80 
nId. 
79DocketNo.381?at2. 
80Docket No. 52, at 22, 34,41 (citing Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1297-99 (10th 
Cir. 2004); Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1202-03). 
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The proper standard for claims of familial association is more complicated. As a 
fundamental liberty interest,81 the right to familial association between a parent and his or her 
child would logically be governed by the same standard applicable to other fundamental rights. 
However, the Tenth Circuit has consistently applied a balancing test to claims for infringement 
of the familial association right.82 In Griffen v. Strong, the Tenth Circuit called for a balancing 
test to determine whether a state actor's conduct "constituted an undue burden" on a plaintiffs 
right to familial association.83 A court applying the undue burden test should balance the 
plaintiffs right to familial association against the relevant interests of the state, considering the 
"severity of the alleged infringement, the need for the defendant's conduct, and any possible 
alternatives."84 This standard clearly involves lower scrutiny than the compelling 
interest/narrowly tailored test applicable to other fundamental rights. Indeed, the Griffen test 
requires the plaintiff to show that the state actor directed his conduct at the familial relationship 
"with knowledge that the . . . conduct will adversely affect that relationship."85 
In its June 2006 Order, the Court opted to apply the Griffen standard as it remains good 
law in the Tenth Circuit, but noted the conflict between the compelling interest/narrowly tailored 
81
 Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 2006) (reciting parents' fundamental 
right to "care, custody and control of their children" in removal context). 
nSee, e.g., Griffen v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying "undue 
burden" balancing test to substantive due process claim based on right of familial association 
between husband and wife); Suasnavas v. Stover, 196 Fed. Appx. 647, 656 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(applying Griffen undue burden test) (unpublished decision). 
* Griffen, 983 F.2d at 1547. 
uId. at 1548. 
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and undue burden standards. As the Seegmiller decision had no occasion to specifically consider 
tihe right to familial association in the child-welfare context or the long line of Tenth Circuit 
cases applying the undue burden test, the Court will continue to apply the Griffen standard to the 
Jensens' familial association claims. 
Clearly, "the right to associate with one's family is a very substantial right."86 However, 
this right "has never been deemed absolute or unqualified."87 It is clear that the state may 
interfere with the right to familial association, even without prior notice and an opportunity to be 
heard, where such action is needed to ensure the safety of a child.88 Thus, the Court must weigh 
the State's interest in protecting children against the Jensens' interest in familial association, 
given the factual record presented, to determine whether the State's interference constituted an 
undue burden on the Jensens' right to familial association. 
With this framework in mind, the Jensens' substantive due process claims against Dr. 
Wagner, Ms. Cunningham, and Mr. Anderson are considered below.89 
Dr, Wagner. The Jensens claim that Dr. Wagner violated their substantive due process 
rights based on the following allegations: (1) Dr. Wagner refused to perform genetic and 
molecular testmg despite the Jensens' requests; (2) Dr. Wagner made this decision because of his 
desire to enroll PJ. in a clinical trial, which he did not disclose to the Jensens; (3) Dr. Wagner 
discouraged the Jensens from seeking a second opinion and then attempted to influence that 
Z1
 Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486,1490 (10th Cir. 1994). 
*
zGomes, 451 F.3d at 1128-29. 
89As discussed above, Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton are entitled to absolute immunity 
on all of the Jensens' § 1983 claims. 
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opinion; (4) Dr. Wagner did not inform Dr. Lemons, Dr. Albritton, Dr. Coffin, Dr. Lowichik, Dr. 
Corwin, Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman, or the Juvenile Court of his refusal to order genetic 
and/or molecular testing; and (5) Dr. Wagner told Ms. Cunningham that P J. could be dead in 
five days in order to persuade her to skip the normal investigative process. 
Having closely examined the record, the Court finds the Jensens have not established that 
Dr. Wagner violated their substantive due process rights. It is undisputed that Drs. Lowichik and 
Coffin diagnosed P.J. with Ewing's Sarcoma after performing immunohistochemical testing. 
According to Dr. Coffin, this diagnosis was rendered with near certainty. Dr. Lowichik 
estimated her level of certainty "in the high 90 percent."90 Dr. Coffin told Dr. Wagner that she 
was confident in the diagnosis and that no farther testing was needed. This, according to Dr. 
Wagner, coupled with the need for immediate treatment, was the reason he did not order 
additional testing. When the Jensens would not agree to begin treatment that he believed was 
necessary to save P.J.'s life, Dr. Wagner referred PJ.'s case to DCFS. The Jensens offer no 
competent evidence to place these facts in dispute. Rather, the Jensens ask the Court to draw a 
number of unreasonable inferences, which the record plainly will not support, in order to 
attribute a more dubious purpose to Dr. Wagner's actions. 
First, the Jensens point to the fact that Dr. Wagner was an administrator of a clinical trial 
for which P.J. might have been eligible, arguing that this was the reason behind Dr. Wagner's 
refusal to order more testing and his insisting on immediate chemotherapy treatment. Even 
assuming that it was inappropriate to refuse further testing and that Dr. Wagner did refuse the 
testing with the study in mind, the Jensens were free, at that point, to take P J. to another facility 
'Docket No. 345, Ex. 16, at 31. 
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and another doctor for further testing. Thus, Dr. Wagner's refusal to order further testing did not, 
of itself, violate the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care free from unreasonable state 
interference. 
Moreover, outside of P.J.'s possible eligibility to participate in the trial, the Jensens have 
produced no evidence that Dr. Wagner's decisions were motivated based on a desire to enroll P.J. 
in the trial Indeed, the record would not permit such an inference. It is undisputed that the trial 
required enrollment within 30 days of the diagnostic biopsy—which, in P J.'s case, occurred on 
May 2,2003. Thus, on June 2, 2003, P J. was no longer eligible to participate in the trial If Dr. 
Wagner's refusal to order the tests and his push to immediately begin chemotherapy were 
motivated by a desire to enroll P J. in the clinical trail, surely his efforts would have ceased or 
changed course after June 2, 2003. However, it is undisputed that Dr. Wagner's efforts to ensure 
that P.J. received chemotherapy continued after this date. It was not until after June 2, 2003, that 
Dr. Wagner involved Dr. Corwin. At the June 9,2003 meeting at PCMC, Dr. Wagner again 
emphasized the need for P.J.'s chemotherapy to begin immediately before the cancer spread 
throughout his body. Finally, it was not until June 16,2003, that Dr. Wagner referred P J.'s case 
to DCFS. In light of these undisputed facts, it is entirely unreasonable to infer that Dr. Wagner's 
motivation for not ordering further testing and seeking immediate treatment was to enroll P.J. in 
the clinical trial 
The Jensens next contend that Dr. Wagner discouraged them from seeking a second 
opinion and then attempted to interfere with that opinion. In support of this claim, the Jensens 
testified that Dr. Wagner told them that insurance companies would often not pay for a second 
opinion, which would require the Jensens to pay for it. The Jensens also cite an email sent by Dr. 
Wagner to the oncologist who was to perform the second opinion, in which he stated, 
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Dear Dr. Grier, 
I am a pediatric oncologist sat [sic] the University of Utah, and I was wondering if 
you could provide consultation for a patient being followed in our clinic. This 12-
year-old boy underwent excision of a dome-shaped lesion at the floor of the 
mouth. After careful review by Cheryl Coffin and other pathologists here in Salt 
Lake, the diagnosis of Ewing's sarcoma has been made. Supporting this 
diagnosis are the presence of small round blue cells which stain for 013, FLI-1, 
and vimentin. There is a weak positivity of S-100. Desmin and actin are 
negative, as are epithelial markers, CD3, and CD45. There was no fresh or frozen 
tissue to send for RT-PCR for Ewing's translocations, although this possibly 
could be done on archival paraffin-embedded tissue. If there is significant 
diagnostic uncertainty, additional fresh tissue could likely be obtained by re-
excision, as the margins were clearly positive. 
I have discussed these results with the family, and expressed my confidence in the 
thorough histologic work-up that has been done by expert personnel However, 
the family is interested in pursuing a second opinion, and has requested that we 
sed [sic] the tslides [sic] and tissue block to you for further review. I have 
explained that you are an oncologist and not a pathologist, etc., and that further 
consultations will delay the start of therapy (the child is now 19 days post-
resection, as the tissue was initially sent to a pathologist in Washington who made 
a diagnosis of "poorly differentiated malignancy" after performing a limited 
immunihistovemocal [sic] work-up). Nevertheless, at their request, I am sending 
by FedEX the tissue to your institution addressed to you. I would greatly 
appreciate your help in expediting pathologic review so we can commence with 
treatment for this young man.91 
This evidence does not rise to the level of a unconstitutional infringement of the Jensens' 
right to direct P J.'s medical care. Whatever his motivations, the Jensens have offered no 
evidence that Dr. Wagner's statement regarding the likelihood of insurance coverage was false. 
Although Dr. Wagner clearly expressed confidence in the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis, along 
with his desire to quickly begin treatment, the above email does not support a reasonable 
inference that Dr. Wagner attempted to interfere with the second opinion sought by the Jensens. 
91Docket No. 345, Ex. 41, at LMW 8. 
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Finally, and most important to their substantive due process claims, the Jensens claim 
that Dr. Wagner did not tell others involved in PJ.'s case—including Ms. Cunningham, Ms. 
Eisenman, and the Juvenile Court—of his refusal to order farther diagnostic tests despite the 
Jensens' requests and that he falsely told Ms. Cunningham that P.J. would be dead within five 
days. With respect to the former, even assuming that Dr. Wagner did in fact fail to tell others 
about his refusal to order the genetic and/or molecular tests, there is no evidence that he did so 
deliberately. Rather, as outlined above, the record demonstrates that Dr. Wagner believed that 
those tests were unnecessary and would delay needed treatment based on the diagnosis of Drs. 
Coffin and Lowichik. To the extent the Jensens claim substantive due process rights that would 
impose liability on Dr. Wagner for failing to disclose seemingly irrelevant facts, such rights are 
not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and, therefore, do not merit protection under the 
compelling interest/narrowly tailored standard. 
With respect to the latter, it is undisputed that Dr. Wagner communicated the emergency 
nature of PJ.'s medical situation to DCFS. The Jensens have not provided any evidence that Dr. 
Wagner did not actually believe this to be true. Instead, they contend that Dr. Wagner convmced 
Ms. Cunningham to forgo normal investigatory procedures by overstating the immediacy of 
PJ.'s medical needs, telling her that PJ. would be dead within five days. The Jensens base this 
assertion entirely on Mr. Anderson's deposition testimony. However, Mr. Anderson did not 
testify that Dr. Wagner made this statement, but that someone told Ms. Cunningham that P J. 
would die within five days. Although Mr. Anderson agreed that it was likely the referring 
doctors, he "never verified who . . . made the statement."92 More important, Mr. Anderson's 
'Docket No. 345, Ex. 2, at 321. 
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testimony on this point is inadmissible hearsay and, therefore, must be disregarded.93 
Accordingly, the record merely shows that Dr. Wagner communicated his belief to Ms. 
Cunningham that PJ. required immediate medical treatment to give him the best chance possible 
of surviving Ewing's Sarcoma, as diagnosed by the pathologists at PCMC. 
In summary, the Jensens ask the Court to find that Dr. Wagner violated their substantive 
due process rights to familial association and to direct PJ.'s medical care based on unreasonable 
inferences that stretch the record far beyond its actual content. This does not satisfy their burden 
of establishing a violation of their constitutional rights. 
The Court finds that Dr. Wagner's conduct in providing medical care for PJ. and 
referring his case to DCFS after the Jensens would not consent to PJ.'s treatment were narrowly 
tailored to serve the State's compelling interest in protecting children. The record demonstrates 
that Dr. Wagner referred PJ.'s case to DCFS after the Jensens refused to consent to 
chemotherapy treatment which Dr. Wagner reasonably believed was necessary to save PJ.'s life. 
There were, perhaps, additional measures that Dr. Wagner could have taken that might have 
avoided the need to involve DCFS. For example, he might have ordered the additional tests 
despite his belief that they were unnecessary and would delay needed treatment However, the 
constitution does not place an affirmative duty on him to do so where he reasonably believed 
PJ.'s life was in danger. To the extent the Jensens claim to the contrary, their substantive due 
process rights are no longer within the boundaries of fundamental rights and, therefore, are only 
entitled to protection under the shocks the conscience standard—which Dr. Wagner's conduct 
does not do. 
*Argo v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., 452 F.3d 1193,1199 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court finds it important that any actual interference with 
the Jensens' substantive due process rights was accomplished by referring the case to DCFS, 
filing the Verified Petition, and presenting P J.'s case to a neutral judge—not by simply 
removing P. J. from his parents and forcing him to undergo chemotherapy. Indeed, the Jensens 
received ample opportunities to present their side of the story to the Juvenile Court. They were 
represented by counsel throughout the Juvenile Court proceedings. The Jensens correctly 
contend that the Constitution would not permit interference with their substantive due process 
rights by means of intentional misrepresentations to the Juvenile Court. However, as outlined 
above, the Jensens have simply not submitted evidence from which the Court can conclude that 
Dr. Wagner deliberately misrepresented the events and circumstances surrounding P J.'s medical 
care to either the Juvenile Court or others involved in P. J.'s case. 
For these same reasons, the Court finds that Dr. Wagner's conduct did not unduly burden 
the familial association rights of the Jensens and P J. Dr. Wagner's decision to refer PJ. to 
DCFS minimally infringed the Jensens' familial association rights, preserving ample opportunity 
for the Jensens to present their interests to the Juvenile Court. Perhaps further discussion might 
have led to a more amiable solution, but in light of the perceived need for immediate treatment, it 
was entirely reasonable to submit P.J.'s medical situation to DCFS authorities. Again, the 
Jensens are correct that intentional and material factual misrepresentations and omissions on the 
part of Dr. Wagner to either DCFS representatives or the Juvenile Court would surely have 
interfered with their associational rights on a much grander scale. However, the record simply 
does not sustain these allegations. Accordingly, the Court will grant Dr. Wagner's Motion for 
Summary Judgment with respect to the Jensens' substantive due process claims. 
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Ms, Cunningham. The Jensens claim that Ms, Cunningham violated their substantive due 
process rights in two ways: (1) by failing to properly investigate P J.'s referral; and (2) by 
making deliberate factual misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court. 
The Court finds that Ms. Cunningham did not violate the Jensens' constitutional rights by 
failing to investigate the representations of Drs. Wagner and Corwin. The Jensens' claims have 
important similarities to the Eighth Circuit case of Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc.94 
The plaintiff in Thomason brought a substantive due process claim against a state social worker 
for violation of her right to "the care, custody and management" of her infant child.95 The social 
worker received a report from a doctor who was treating the plaintiffs child, including two 
letters and an article from the Journal of Pediatrics, which stated his concern that the plaintiff 
might be suffering from a psychological disorder that causes her to partially suffocate her child 
in order to garner the attention of health care professionals.96 Without investigating the 
allegations, the social worker removed the child from the plaintiffs custody and "arguably 
mischaracterized" the doctor's report in an affidavit to the juvenile court.97 The Eighth Circuit 
held that the social worker's failure to investigate did not violate the parent plaintiffs 
constitutional rights where she relied on the doctor's "reasonable suspicion that life-threatening 
abuse [was] occurring in the home."98 
'85 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1996). 
'Id. at 1370. 
*Id. at 1368. 
'Id. at 1372. 
5M at 1373. 
41 
Similar to the social worker in Thomason, Ms. Cunningham relied on the information 
provided to her by PJ.'s treating physician in filing the Verified Petition. The Jensens have 
produced no evidence that Ms. Cunningham had reason to suspect the information and opinions 
given to her by Drs. Wagner and Corwin were misleading. Rather, the Jensens contend that if 
Ms. Cunningham would have fulfilled her duties under Utah law to investigate PJ.'s referral, she 
would have discovered the misrepresentations and omissions allegedly made to her by the 
doctors. However, any duty to investigate that Ms. Cunningham may have had under State law 
cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim for violation of substantive due process." 
In this emergency situation, like the one in Thomason, Ms. Cunningham was reasonable 
in relying on the information provided to her by the doctors, even in the absence of any further 
investigation. Dr. Wagner communicated to Ms. Cunningham that PJ.'s situation was a medical 
emergency and that PJ.'s life was in danger, thus implicating the State's compelling interest in 
PJ.'s safety. The means used by Ms. Cunningham to address the State's compelling interest in 
the emergency medical situation were narrowly tailored. Ms. Cunningham did not seek to 
immediately remove P J. from the home. Rather, she filed the Verified Petition, thus instituting a 
state court proceeding where the Jensens would have an opportunity to rebut the doctor's 
allegations. If the situation had been represented to Ms. Cunningham as something less than an 
urgent medical emergency, perhaps a duty to investigate could be constitutionally required. Such 
a duty may be needed in non-emergency situations in order to curb "overzealous suspicion and 
intervention on the part of health care professionals and government officials," which "may have 
"See Jones v. City and County of Denver, 854 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1988) 
("Section 1983 does not, however, provide a basis for redressing violations of state law, but only 
for those violations of federal law done under color of state law."). 
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the effect of discouraging parents and care takers from communicating with doctors or seeking 
appropriate medical attention for children with real or potentially life-threatening conditions."100 
However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Ms. Cunningham did not reasonably 
believe the doctors* contentions that PJ.'s life was in danger and immediate action was 
necessary to ensure his welfare. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Jensens have not 
established a constitutional violation of either their right to familial association or their right to 
direct PJ.'s medical care with respect to Ms. Cunningham's actions in failing to investigate 
PJ.'s referral and in filing the Verified Petition. 
The Court also finds that the Jensens have not established a constitutional violation based 
on Ms. Cunningham's alleged misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court. As an 
initial matter, the Court notes that the Jensens have failed in their opposition memorandum to 
point out the specific factual misrepresentations and omissions on which they base their claim 
against Ms. Cunningham. As the Jensens bear the burden of establishing a constitutional 
violation of the their substantive due process rights, this failure alone entitles Ms. Cunningham to 
qualified immunity.101 
Nonetheless, having carefiilly reviewed their opposition memorandum, the Jensens 
appear to base their substantive due process claims on three instances in which they contend Ms. 
Cunningham made factual misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court: (1) the 
Verified Petition; and (2) an August 8,2003 affidavit; and (3) an August 18, 2003 affidavit. The 
mThomason, 85 F.3d at im. 
10I
"Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs." U.S. v. Griebel, 2008 
WL 1741503, * 4 (10th Cir. Apr. 14,2008) (quoting Gross v. BurggrafConstr. Co., 53 F3d 
1531,1546 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
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Jensens have not brought forth any evidence that Ms. Cunningham knew that the information 
contained in the Verified Petition was misleading or deficient. As outlined above, Ms. 
Cunningham had no constitutional duty to investigate the information provided her by PCMC 
doctors before filing it. Thus, Ms. Cunningham's statements in the Verified Petition do not 
establish a violation of the Jensens' substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the Jensens' 
substantive due process claims depend entirely on the misrepresentations and omissions 
allegedly made by Ms. Cunningham in her August 2003 affidavits. 
Assuming the Jensens' version of the facts, the "misrepresentations and omissions" made 
by Ms. Cunningham in her August 2003 affidavits do not establish a constitutional violation. 
The Jensens claim that Ms. Cunningham made the following misrepresentations and omissions 
in both her August 8 and August 18 affidavits: (1) stating that a sample of PJ.'s tumor was sent 
to Dana-Farber for a second opinion without stating that the second opinion was never given; (2) 
stating that P J. underwent a CT and Bone Scan without stating that these tests were normal; (3) 
stating that the Jensens wanted to use IPT to treat P J. when they were actually no longer 
interested; (4) omitting to state that the "controlling" genetic tests were not yet complete; (5) 
omitting to state that she had not actually spoken with Dr. Coffin; (6) referring to Dr Birkmayer 
as a man rather than as a doctor; and (7) stating that Dr. Tishler recommended in the July 28, 
2003 hearing that P.J. should begin chemotherapy when Dr. Tishler had actually reserved his 
final opinion until all the testing was complete. 
Upon close inspection of the circumstances in which Ms. Cunningham submitted her 
August 2003 affidavits, the alleged misrepresentations and omissions were of little, if any, 
consequence. Of the alleged misrepresentations and omissions listed above, only numbers 4 and 
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7 have any potential significance. However, the record clearly reveals that they cannot support 
the Jensens' claims. 
In the hearing held on July 28,2003, the Juvenile Court clearly ordered that P J. begin 
chemotherapy by August 8,2003. The Jensens did not begin PJ.'s chemotherapy by that date. 
Ms. Cunningham's August 2003 affidavits were submitted with the State's application to take 
P.J. into protective custody as a result of the Jensens' failure to begin PJ.'s chemotherapy. 
The hearing transcript shows that Dr. Tishler did in fact recommend that P J. begin 
chemotherapy at the July 28 hearing and that any burden to place further test results before the 
Juvenile Court was on the Jensens. At the July 28 hearing, Mr. Nakamura clearly advocated the 
Jensens' concern that some of the testing was not yet completed: Dr. Tishler indicated that there 
was no question that P J. had a malignant tumor that would require chemotherapy and that the 
remaining pathological and radiological tests would merely serve to clarify what type of tumor 
hehad. Upon hearing and accepting this, the Juvenile Court ordered that PJ.'s chemotherapy be 
commenced before August 8, 2003, without regard to the test results. The Juvenile Court also 
stated in the July 28 hearing that should the test results indicate that chemotherapy was not 
needed, the Jensens were free to bring that to the court's attention. Thus, numbers 4 and 7 were 
not misrepresentations or omissions at all, as demonstrated by the hearing transcript itself. 
The other alleged misrepresentations and omissions were plainly immaterial. Numbers 
one, two, and three are listed in Ms. Cunningham's August 18 affidavit as information provided 
to her by Dr. Wagner around June 16,2003. Although this information provided useful 
background information, it was clearly not material to the issues before the Juvenile Court in 
mid-August 2003. Those issues centered on the Jensens' failure to comply with the Juvenile 
Court's order that P.J. begin chemotherapy by August 8, 2003. With respect to number 5, Ms. 
45 
Cunningham did not state that she spoke with Dr. Coffin. Rather, she merely states that 
according to Dr. Coffin, the Jensens had Dr. Christensen do a second oral surgery on P.J.'s 
mouth resulting in an additional sample that was sent to the University of Washington—a fact 
that the parties do not dispute. Finally, and exemplary of the "misrepresentations and omissions" 
the Jensens allege Ms. Cunningham made, Ms. Cunningham's reference to Dr. Birkmayer as a 
man rather than a doctor was not material to the matters before the Juvenile Court at that time. 
The Court finds that the misrepresentations and omissions allegedly made by Ms. 
Cunningham were completely immaterial to the issues before the Juvenile Court and, therefore, 
did not interfere with the Jensens* substantive due process rights, even under the compelling 
interest/narrowly tailored standard.102 As outlined above, Ms. Cunningham instituted process 
before a State court of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim of medical neglect against 
the Jensens. In this proceeding, the Jensens' fundamental rights to direct the custody, care, and 
control of their son were carefully balanced by a neutral judge. There is simply insufficient 
evidence that Ms. Cunningham deliberately misrepresented or omitted material facts to the 
Juvenile Court. 
Mr. Anderson. The Jensens allege that Mr. Anderson violated their rights to familial 
association and to direct PJ.'s medical care by (1) interfering with their ability to select their 
doctors; (2) refusing to withdraw the Verified Petition; (3) intentionally failing to disclose 
material facts to the Juvenile Court; and (4) failing to properly train and supervise DCFS case 
workers. The Court finds the Jensens have not established that Mr. Anderson violated their 
substantive due process rights. 
l02Accordingly, the Court also finds that Ms. Cunningham's actions did not violate the 
Jensens' substantive due process rights under the undue burden and shocks the conscience tests. 
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First, the Jensens claim that Ms. Anderson violated their right to direct P.J.'s medical 
care by insisting that the State select the doctor who would treat P J. According to the Jensens, a 
parent is entitled to choose the doctor who will provide medical treatment to their child as long 
as the alternatives are reasonable. They contend that Mr. Anderson "took the position that the 
State could force the parents to go to the court and let the court decide which physician was 
'better/"103 thus preventing the Jensens from placing P J, under the care of either Dr. Birkmayer 
or Dr. Simone. 
The Court finds, based on the circumstances of the case, that this does not amount to a 
constitutional violation of the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care. Mr. Anderson's 
involvement with P J.'s case did not begin until late August 2003. By this time, the Juvenile 
Court had already held a number of hearings to determine the medical care that was in P J.'s best 
interest. To that end, the Juvenile Court ordered P J. to begin chemotherapy administered by a 
board-certified pediatric oncologist by August 8, 2003. The Jensens did not meet this deadline 
and the Juvenile Court granted protective custody of P.J. to the State. It was at this point that Mr. 
Anderson become involved in the case, attempting to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution. In 
his negotiations, Mr. Anderson took the position that P.J. must be treated with chemotherapy by 
a board-certified pediatric oncologist. This position was in accord with both the Juvenile Court's 
order and the opinion of Dr. Tishler who had evaluated P.J. Most important, as even the Jensens' 
acknowledge, Mr. Anderson's position was that if the Jensens wanted a different doctor, they 
could make their request to the Juvenile Court. The Juvenile Court was readily available to hear 
and determine whether the Jensens' desire to have a different doctor treat P J. was in his best 
;DocketNo. 340, at 9. 
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interest. In light of these undisputed facts—particularly the fact that the negotiations were 
conducted during the course of the Juvenile Court proceedings, which provided ample 
process—Mr. Anderson's "position" that having a board-certified pediatric oncologist treat P.J. 
was in his best interest was narrowly tailored to serve the State's compelling interest in 
protecting P J. Accordingly, such does not amount to a constitutional violation. 
The Jensens also allege that Mr. Anderson violated their constitutional rights by refusing 
to withdraw the medical neglect allegations despite his admission that the Jensens were not 
neglectful parents. The Jensens base this assertion on their depositions, in which they testified 
that during negotiations with Mr. Anderson in late August 2003, Mr. Anderson said, "I 
understand you're a great parent. I can see that, but we can't let you go. We can't have it over. 
It's gone too far."104 The Jensens ask the Court to infer from this that Mr. Anderson knew the 
Jensens were not guilty of medical neglect but chose to maintain the Verified Petition anyway for 
political reasons. 
These statements do not establish a violation of the Jensens' substantive due process 
rights. The negotiations between the Jensens and Mr. Anderson began in late August 2003, after 
the Juvenile Court had already granted protective custody of P.J. to the State and ordered that he 
undergo chemotherapy to treat the cancer that multiple medical professionals indicated he had. 
Mr. Anderson traveled to Idaho in an attempt to negotiate an amiable resolution with the Jensens. 
The above statements were allegedly made during the course of these negotiations. Upon this 
background of undisputed facts, the Court cannot reasonably infer from Mr. Anderson's alleged 
statements that the medical neglect allegations were baseless, that Mr. Anderson knew it, and 
Docket No. 345, at f 382. 
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that he admitted as much to the Jensens. Mr. Anderson's attempt to negotiate a workable 
solution to the out-of-hand situation in no way interfered with the Jensens' right to familial 
association or their right to direct PJ.'s medical care. 
The Jensens also allege that Mr. Anderson violated their substantive due process rights by 
intentionally failing to inform the Juvenile Court of the following: (1) definitive testing had 
never been performed on PJ.'s tissue; and (2) Dr. Johnston had materially breached his 
agreement to refrain from rendering a diagnosis before completing the independent testing. 
These allegations provide neither a factual nor legal basis to find that Mr. Anderson 
violated the Jensens' substantive due process rights. With regard to first alleged omission, the 
Jensens have not directed the Court to evidence that Mr. Anderson knew the Juvenile Court was 
unaware of the possibility for genetic testing or that genetic tests were "definitive." Rather, they 
cite to the deposition testimony of PJ.'s guardian ad litem in which she indicates that she was 
unaware of the possibility for genetic testing until September 4,2003. This does not show that 
Mr. Anderson intentionally withheld information about genetic testing from the Juvenile Court. 
Moreover, the Jensens repeatedly stated their desire for further testing during the Juvenile Court 
proceedings. 
With respect to the second alleged omission, the Jensens contend that Mr. Anderson was 
aware that Dr. Johnston had determined to recommend chemotherapy before receiving the results 
of the genetic tests in violation of the September 5, 2003 stipulation and that Mr. Anderson failed 
to inform the Juvenile Court of this fact. Mr. Anderson testified that he understood Dr. Johnston 
would perform an independent evaluation of PJ.'s medical condition, including independent 
testing, before rendering a final treatment recommendation. Mr. Anderson also testified that he 
was aware the genetic tests were not finished when Dr. Johnston determined to recommend 
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chemotherapy. However, there is no evidence that Mr. Anderson understood that rendering a 
diagnosis before completion of the genetic testing breached the September 5 stipulation. The 
deposition testimony cited by the Jensens only refers to "independent testing."105 There is no 
indication in either Mr. Anderson's testimony, or in the written stipulation, that Dr. Johnston 
could not have sufficiently confirmed the diagnosis through independent testing, like the 
pathological testing conducted by Dr. Coffin, even though the genetic testing was not complete. 
Moreover, there is no evidence showing that Mr. Anderson intentionally withheld the fact that 
the genetic testing was incomplete from the Juvenile Court. The Court cannot find that Mr. 
Anderson was deliberately withholding information from the Juvemle Court based merely on the 
fact that he knew the genetic tests—which Dr. Johnston testified were immaterial to his treatment 
recommendation—were not yet complete. Most important, the Jensens have failed to show how 
Mr. Anderson's alleged failure to disclose this information interfered with their right to direct 
PJ.'s medical care. The Jensens refused to follow Dr. Johnston's treatment recommendations, 
which lead to DCFS's decision to dismiss the case shortly thereafter. The only action taken by 
the Juvenile Court subsequent to Dr. Johnston's recommendation was to dismiss the case. 
Finally, the Jensens argue that Mr. Anderson should be liable for failure to adequately 
train and supervise DCFS case workers. Presumably, although it is far than clear, the Jensens 
claim that Mr. Anderson is liable for the injuries resulting from Ms. Cunningham's actions in 
failing to properly investigate PJ.'s referral because he failed to train her. The Jensens cite to the 
case of City of Canton v. Harris106 for the proposition that a supervisor who acts with deliberate 
;DocketNo.345,Ex.2,at249. 
5489 U.S. 378 (1989). 
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indifference in failing to train and supervise subordinates is subject to liability under section 
1983. 
The Jensens' failure to train and supervise claim fails for two reasons. First, the Jensens 
have not brought any evidence to the Court's attention that could show Mr. Anderson acted with 
"deliberate indifference"107 to the rights of others in failing to train Ms. Cunningham. Second, 
the Jensens have not established that Ms. Cunningham's conduct violated their constitutional 
rights, a prerequisite to Mr. Anderson's liability for failure to train her.108 
In sum, the Court finds that none of Mr. Anderson's actions during his involvement with 
PJ.'s case interfered with the Jensens' substantive due process rights. 
2. Procedural Due Process 
The Jensens claim that each of the Defendants violated their procedural due process 
rights, Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman, and Mr. Anderson present argument on these claims. 
Dr. Wagner incorporates these arguments by reference. However, as Ms. Eisenman and Dr. 
Albritton enjoy absolute immunity, the Jensens' procedural due process claims against them are 
not discussed. 
Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens claim that Ms. Cunningham violated their procedural due 
process rights by failing to properly investigate PJ. 's referral and by intentionally 
misrepresenting facts to the Juvenile Court. 
At its most basic level, due process ensures that a person may not be deprived of an 
interest in life, liberty, or property without "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningfiil time and 
7 i a t 3 8 8 . 
^ at 391. 
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in a meaningful manner."1 As noted by the Court in its June 2006 Decision, the Due Process 
Clause also requires that "the notice and hearing . . . be fair."110 Accordingly, in considering the 
Defendants' motions to dismiss in June 2006, the Court found that the Jensens' allegation that 
"[Ms. Cunningham] intentionally misrepresented or omitted facts in the Jensens' case, including 
the status of allegedly confirmatory tests, to the Utah juvenile court" was sufficient to state a 
claim for violation of their rights to procedural due process.111 
However, as set forth above, the Jensens have failed to submit evidence that Ms. 
Cunningham deliberately made material misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court. 
Rather, the Jensens merely nitpick Ms. Cunningham's August 2003 affidavits. These alleged 
misstatements are not the type of intentional falsities that would render an otherwise procedurally 
sound judicial proceeding "unfair."112 Rather, these misrepresentations, which dealt with facts 
known to the Jensens, were more properly addressed by the Jensens' counsel at the August 8, 
2003 hearing before the Juvenile Court. For example, the Jensens' counsel could, if desired, 
easily have pointed out to the Juvenile Court that Dr. Birkmayer was more than just a "man." 
Thus, the Jensens have not established a violation of their procedural due process rights with 
regard to the alleged factual misrepresentations and omissions. 
mMathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 
545, 552 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
U0DocketNo. 52, at 23 ("[T]he Due Process Clause also encompasses . . . a guarantee of 
fair procedure.") (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
mSee, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959) (finding due process violation 
where witness gave perjured testimony that he had received no promise in return for his 
testimony when in reality he had). 
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Additionally, the Court finds that the Jensens' had no liberty interest in the investigation 
of child abuse claims required of DCFS case workers under Utah law and, therefore, cannot 
establish a violation of their procedural due process rights by virtue of Ms. Cunningham's failure 
to carry out that investigation. "Protected liberty interests may arise from two sources—the Due 
Process Clause itself and the laws of the States."113 A State may create a liberty interest "by 
establishing substantive predicates to govern official decision-making . . . and by mandating the 
outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met."114 Both of these 
elements are necessary for the creation of a liberty interest. Thus, where state law requires the 
ftilfilment of specified substantive predicates but does not mandate a certain outcome, there is no 
liberty interest.115 
"State-created procedures . . . do not create such an entitlement where none would 
otherwise exist."116 As stated by the Supreme Court: "Process is not an end in itself. Its 
constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate 
claim of entitlement."117 For example, in Pierce v. Delta County Department of Social Services, 
the plaintiffs argued that Colorado's Child Protection Act created a liberty interest by mandating 
mKy. Dept ofCorr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,461 (1989) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 
459 U.S. 460,466 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
n4Id. at 462 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
U5Id. at 464-465. 
mPierce v. Delta County Dept ofSoc. Servs., 119F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1152-53 (D. Colo. 
2000). 
lll0lim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983). 
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that acts of child abuse be reported and properly investigated.118 The court rejected this 
contention, finding that the Colorado statutes at issue merely mandated procedure without 
dictating "a particular substantive outcome or guarantee."119 
The Jensens contend that Utah law, by statue, imposes mandatory duties to perform 
specific investigative actions before doing anything that might affect parental rights. Even 
assuming that this is the case, the Jensens merely assert a liberty interest in process, not in 
substantive outcomes. The Jensens do not point to any section of the Utah Code that sets forth a 
specific substantive predicate that, when fulfilled, dictates a specific substantive outcome. This 
does not create the sort of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause. 
Thus, the Jensens have failed to establish that Ms. Cunningham violated their procedural 
due process rights. 
Mr. Anderson. The Jensens claim that Mr. Anderson implemented a policy whereby case 
workers would not investigate allegations of medical neglect when made by doctors from PCMC 
and that this policy violated their due process rights.120 The Jensens also claim that this policy 
violated their right to equal protection. However, because they did not plead an equal protection 
claim, and apparently asserted it for the first time in the summary judgment briefing, the Court 
will not consider this argument. 
mPierce, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1153. 
U9Id. 
120At some point, the Jensens also claimed that Mr. Anderson made factual 
misrepresentations and omissions to the state courts. However, the Jensens have not pursued this 
theory in their summary judgment briefing and have submitted no evidence to support it. 
54 
The Jensens have failed to submit any evidence that DCFS actually had a policy of not 
investigating medical neglect allegations if they were made by PCMC doctors. Rather, the 
Jensens ask the Court to infer that such a policy was instituted by Mr. Anderson based on the 
following: (1) Ms. Cunningham did not investigate P.J.'s referral; (2) Ms. Cunningham testified 
that she believed her actions were consistent with DCFS policy; and (3) Ms. Cunningham 
testified that Mr. Anderson told her she handled P.J.'s case appropriately. This evidence is 
simply not enough to show that DCFS had a policy of never investigating medical neglect 
allegations made by PCMC doctors. Ms. Cunningham's alleged failure to investigate P J.'s 
referral took place in a situation that was represented to her by Dr. Wagner as a medical 
emergency requiring prompt action. To the extent that her alleged failure to investigate did 
represent DCFS policy, it merely shows that DCFS policy allowed case workers to file a custody 
petition with a juvenile court of competent jurisdiction without further investigation when 
presented with objectively reasonable allegations of emergency medical neglect made by a 
doctor charged with the child's medical care. As explained in detail above, such a policy would 
not violate a parent's rights under the Due Process Clause. Moreover, even if DCFS did have a 
policy of never investigating referrals submitted by PCMC doctors, such a policy did not harm 
the Jensens in P J.'s emergency case. Thus, the Court finds the Jensens have failed to establish 
that Mr. Anderson violated their procedural due process rights. 
Dr. Wagner. As the Jensens received ample notice and an opportunity to be heard, any 
procedural due process claims against Dr. Wagner must be based on his alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions. However, as set forth above, the Jensens have not submitted 
competent evidence that Dr. Wagner deliberately misrepresented or omitted material facts to the 
Juvenile Court or others involved in the case. Moreover, any misrepresentations and omissions 
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allegedly made by Dr. Wagner did not make the Juvenile Court proceedings unfair. The record 
demonstrates that the Jensens received ample opportunity to present their desire for further 
testing in the Juvenile Court. In fact, these desires were heard and decided upon by that court. 
The Jensens have not established that Dr. Wagner violated their procedural due process rights. 
3. Malicious Prosecution 
In their third cause of action, the Jensens121 allege that each of the Defendants122 violated 
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by instituting and 
continuing a "malicious prosecution/9 Each of the Defendants has moved for summary judgment 
on this claim. Notably, the Jensens have failed to respond to Mr. Anderson's motion on this 
point. Accordingly, the Court will grant his motion with respect to the Fourth Amendment 
claim. 
Under Tenth Circuit law, analysis of a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment is guided by the elements of the common law tort of 
malicious prosecution.123 However, "the ultimate question in such a case is whether plaintiff has 
proven the deprivation of a constitutional right."124 As recently stated by the Tenth Circuit in 
Wilkins v. DeReyes, 
121
 As the Court dismissed P J.'s Fourth Amendment claim in its June 2006 Order, Mr. and 
Ms. Jensen proceed without him on this claim. 
122The Jensens' malicious prosecution claims against Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton are 
not discussed in light of their absolute immunity. 
mBeckerv. Kroll, 494F.3d 904, 913-14 (10th Cir. 2007). 
mWilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Novitsky v. City of 
Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244,1257-58 (10th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Under our cases, a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim includes the 
following elements: (1) the defendant caused the plaintiffs continued 
confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the 
plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued 
confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the 
plaintiff sustained damages.125 
The Jensens seek damages for malicious prosecution arising from both the Juvenile Court 
proceedings and the criminal case. 
a. Juvenile Court Proceedings. 
To establish a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, the 
plaintiff must show that a seizure actually occurred.126 In Becker v. Kroll, the Tenth Circuit 
considered a § 1983 plaintiff's claim that she was seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment even though she "was never arrested, incarcerated, or otherwise placed under the 
direct physical control of the state."127 The plaintiff—who was charged with a felony offense in 
a state court—argued that investigation into her alleged criminal activity "imposed burdens on 
her time, finances, and reputation by requiring her to travel to and attend meetings, pay legal 
costs, and eventually, face criminal charges" and, therefore, constituted a seizure for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.128 The court declined "to expand Fourth Amendment liability in cases 
where the plaintiff has not been arrested or incarcerated."129 Specifically, the court noted that 







charging decision would support a § 1983 malicious prosecution-type claim no matter the 
context/'130 
It is undisputed that neither Mr. Jensen nor Ms. Jensen was arrested, incarcerated, or 
otherwise placed under the direct physical control of the State as a result of the proceedings in 
the Juvenile Court. Recognizing this, the Jensens argue that the Court should expand the Fourth 
Amendment concept of "seizure" to accord with that proposed in Justice Ginsberg's concurrence 
in Albright v. Oliver.m The Jensens contend that they suffered "significant, ongoing 
deprivation[s] of liberty as a result of the Juvenile Court proceedings/' which constitute a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment, as follows: 
The Jensens were unable to return to the state of Utah (their home) without the 
threat of arrest and removal of their child. They were unable to take their child for 
an evaluation in Houston, and to other physicians of their choosing, because the 
State forbid it. They were subjected to mandatory court appearances. They were 
ordered to give up their passports. [Mr. Jensen] lost his job, and was exposed to 
serious diminishment of other employment prospects, both because he was 
terminated from his previous job, and because he had to devote his time, finances, 
energy and efforts to attempting to protect his and his family's rights. The 
Jensens were subjected to close media scrutiny and held up to public ridicule and 
contempt. Finally, the Jensens endured the horrible financial and emotional strain 
of defending their family from neglect proceedings that were based entirely upon 
misrepresentations and deceit.132 
Although acknowledging the burdens experienced by the Jensens m defending 
themselves, the Court simply cannot find that they experienced a Fourth Amendment seizure as a 
result of the Juvenile Court proceedings. Tenth Circuit precedent clearly mandates the contrary. 
131510 U.S. 266 (1994). 
132DoeketNo. 342, at 15-16. 
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Accordingly, the Court finds that the Jensens have failed to establish a Fourth Amendment 
violation related to the Juvenile Court proceedings, 
b. Criminal Case 
With regard to the criminal case, the Defendants focus their challenges on the first and 
third prongs above: causation and probable cause. Because it is clear that neither Dr. Wagner nor 
Ms. Cunningham caused the prosecution of the criminal action against the Jensens, analysis of 
probable cause is unnecessary. 
In order to establish a constitutional violation, the Jensens must show that Dr. Wagner 
and Ms. Cunningham "caused the plaintiffs continued confinement or prosecution."133 In 
Pierce, the Tenth Circuit held that this element reaches more than just those who actually initiate 
a criminal action.134 Surveying both the common law and cases interpreting the reach of the 
Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that a forensic analyst who fabricated inculpatory 
evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence, thereby leading prosecutors to indict and 
prosecute" the plaintiff, sufficiently caused the plaintiffs continued prosecution for purposes of 
the plaintiffs § 1983 claim, even though she did not formally initiate the charges.135 In each of 
the examples used by the Pierce court to reach this conclusion, the state actor's conduct was 
closely connected to either the initiation or continuation of the prosecution.136 Notably, the 
133
^7fen^528F.3dat799. 
U4Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1291-92. 
™Id. at 1291-94. 
l36Id. at 1292 ("[A] private person who takes an active part in continuing or procuring the 
continuation of criminal proceedings initiated by himself or by another is subject to the same 
liability for malicious prosecution as if he had initiated the proceedings.") (citing Restatement 
(Second) Torts § 655); id. (citing Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 655-56 (10th Cir. 1990) 
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principles described by the Pierce court closely resemble the definition of a complaining witness 
provided in Anthony v. Baker*31 for purposes of determining the applicability of prosecutorial 
immunity: "The term 'complaining witness* describes the person (or persons) who actively 
instigated or encouraged the prosecution of the plaintiff"138 
The Court finds that Dr. Wagner did not cause the initiation or continued prosecution of 
the criminal case. The Jensens' claims with regard to Dr. Wagner relate entirely to information 
provided to DCFS, its representatives, Ms. Eisenman, and the Juvenile Court. In fact, Dr. 
Wagner moved to Ohio in late June 2003 during the pendency of the Juvenile Court proceedings 
and before any change in PJ.'s legal custody. Dr. Wagner's final involvement with the Juvenile 
Court proceedings was his execution of an affidavit dated July 22,2003, outlining basically the 
same information provided previously to DCFS in his case summary. Dr. Wagner executed the 
affidavit at Ms. Eisenman's request. The affidavit was to be used in connection with the Juvenile 
Court proceedings. There is no evidence that Dr. Wagner ever had contact with anyone from the 
District Attorney's Office. Initiation and continuation of the criminal case were dependant on 
multiple intervening events, including, most notably, the Jensens failure to comply with the 
Juvenile Court's orders. Thus, Dr. Wagner did not cause the initiation or continuation of the 
(finding "sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the [defendant police officers] purposefully 
concealed and misrepresented material facts to the district attorney which may have influenced 
his decision to prosecute [the plaintiff]")); id. ("If police officers have been instrumental in the 
plaintiffs continued confinement or prosecutions, they cannot escape liability by pointing to the 
decisions of prosecutors or grand jurors, or magistrates to confine or prosecute him.") (quoting 
Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
137955 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1992). 
i38M.atl399n.2. 
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criminal case based solely on his referral of P.J.'s case to DCFS and his limited participation in 
the Juvenile Court proceedings. 
The Court likewise finds that Ms. Cunningham did not cause the initiation or continued 
prosecution of the criminal case. The Jensens argue that Ms. Cunningham's participation in the 
criminal case is shown by the fact that her name appears on the probable cause statement on 
which the criminal charges were based and that Ms. Eisenman testified that Ms. Cunningham 
provided information to Officer Peterson, who authored that statement. Even if this were true,139 
it does not provide an evidentiary basis on which the Court could conclude that Ms. Cunningham 
caused the prosecution of the criminal case. The Jensens do not indicate what information Ms. 
Cunningham may have provided nor its relevance to the criminal charges—nor do they indicate 
the circumstances in which Ms. Cunningham provided the information. Accordingly, the Court 
finds the Jensens have failed to establish that Ms. Cunningham caused the initiation or 
continuation of the criminal prosecution. 
The Jensens argue that the Court should apply principles of concurrent causation to hold 
all of the Defendants liable for the malicious prosecution. In the § 1983 context, "[w]here 
multiple forces are actively operating... plaintiffs may demonstrate that each defendant is a 
concurrent cause by showing that his or her conduct was a substantial factor in bringing [the 
injury] about."140 Where concurrent causation is established, the burden of proof shifts to each 
In reality, the Court cannot assume Ms. Eisenman so testified because the deposition 
pages cited by the Jensens were left out of their exhibits, despite receiving an opportunity to 
supplement the record. See Docket No. 375 (ordering the Jensens to provide any materials 
inadvertently omitted from their exhibits). 
mLippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Northington v. Marin, 
102 F.3d 1564,1568-69 (10th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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defendant to prove that his conduct was not the cause of the harm. Should a defendant fail to 
do so, he is liable for the whole injury under principles of joint and several liability.142 
The Jensens have not shown that principles of concurrent causation should apply to their 
Fourth Amendment claim. The Jensens have not submitted any evidence that Dr. Wagner or Ms. 
Cunningham provided information to the District Attorney's Office or that their involvement in 
the Juvenile Court case led to the initiation or continuation of the criminal charges. In fact, this 
is not even consistent with the Jensens' version of the facts: "Eisenman was driving the criminal 
charges effort, not McDonald or Cunningham."143 Accordingly, there is no evidentiary basis on 
which to apply principles of concurrent causation and joint and several liability to the Jensens' 
claim for malicious prosecution of the criminal case. Therefore, the Court finds that the Jensens 
have not established that Dr. Wagner and Ms. Cunningham violated their Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
D. State Law Claims 
The Court does not have original jurisdiction over any of the Jensens' state law claims. 
As this Order disposes of all of the Jensens' federal claims, and as their Utah constitutional 
claims present important questions of state law, the Court declines to further exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and will remand them to the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, from which this case was removed.144 
mNorthzngton} 102 F3d at 1568. 
l42Id. at 1569. 
l43DocketNo.342,at20. 
w




For all of the reasons set forth above, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Defendant Richard Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 
No. 324], Defendant Kari Cunningham's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 326], 
Defendant Susan Eisenman's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 329], and Defendants 
Wagner and Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 332] are GRANTED IN 
PART with respect to Claims 1,2, and 3 of the Complaint. It is further 
ORDERED that Defendant Susan Eisenman's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Consolidated 
Statement of Fact [Docket No. 349], Defendant Wagner's and Albritton's Motion to Strike 
References to P J.'s Current Condition [Docket No. 353], Defendants Wagner's and Albritton's 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Hearsay [Docket No. 356], and Defendant Wagner's and Albritton's 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Attempts to Rebut Medical Evidence Without Expert Testimony 
[Docket No. 358] are DENIED AS MOOT. It is further 
ORDERED that the Jensens' state law claims (Claims 5, 6,7,9, and 10) are 
REMANDED to the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. It is 
further 
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case forthwith. 
DATED September 22,2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
IJWedraates District Judge 
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I am also returning your original record received by the federal court on 09/29/2005 
Please return a signed copy of this letter in the enclosed self-addressed envelope. 
Sincerely, 





cc: Counsel of record 
FedEx Mail Receipt No.: 792754384489 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT: 
Received by: 
Date: 
350 South Main Street'Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 • (801)524-6100 •www,utd.uscourts.£OV 
D. Mark Jones 
Clerk of Court 
September 22,2008 
<$-kv DISTRICT COURT - SALT LShar 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA JENSEN vs. 
kSE NUMBER 050912502 Civil Rights 
STATE OF UTAH U.S DISTRICT COURT 
7fBfi SEP 2 ^ * * * 2 2 
fRRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
LESLIE A LEWIS 
RTIES 
Plaintiff - BARBARA JENSEN 
Plaintiff - DAREN JENSEN 
Represented by: ROGER P CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant - STATE OF UTAH 
PO BOX 14220 
EAST OFFICE BLDG #E22 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114 
Represented by: ROGER P CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant - INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE 
36 S STATE ST FL 22 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Defendant - KARI CUNNINGHAM 
120 N 200 2 #225 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84103 
Defendant - RICHARD ANDERSON 
120 N 200 W #225 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84103 
Defendant - LARS WAGNER 
3333 BURNET AVE 
CINCINNATI, OH 45229 
Defendant - DAVID L CORWIN 
50 N MEDICAL DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84132 
Defendant - CHERYL M COFFIN 
50 N MEDICAL DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84132 
Defendant - KAREN H ALBRITTON 
50 N MEDICAL DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84132 
01SWCT SffUTMl 
1: oSCy/ 9-3^ p 6 C 
m t e d : 09 /29 /05 0 8 : 5 1 : 3 7 Page 1 
SE NUMBER 050912502 Civij. Rights 
Defendant - SUSAN EISENMAN 
PO BOX 140811 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114 
COUNT SUMMARY 
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BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Civil, Mi 

































Case filed by teressah 
Judge LEWIS assigned. 
Filed: Complaint No Amount 
Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 
Fee Account created Total Due: 75.0 0 
COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S, 
- CIVIL 
JURY DEMAND - CIVIL 
Bond Account created 
Bond Posted 
Fee Account created 
COPY FEE 
Fee Account created 
COPY FEE 




75.00 Payment Received: 
Total Due: 3 00.00 
Payment Received: 3 00.00 
Total Due: 17.50 
Payment Received: 17.50 
Total Due: 16.00 
Payment Received: 16.00 
Total Due: 16.00 
Payment Received: 16.00 
Filed return: Affidavit of Service. To: Intermountain Health 
Care, INC. 
Party Served: Julie Swenson - Legal Assistant 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: August 08, 2 005 
Filed: Defendant Susan Eisenman"s Waiver of Service of Summons 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f). 
Filed: Defendant Richard Anderson's Waiver of Service of 
Summons Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (f). 
Filed: Defendant Richard AndersonTs Waiver of Service of 
Summons Pursant toUtah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f). 
Filed: Defendant Kari Cunningham's Waiver of Service of 
Summons Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil procedure 4(f) 
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\SE NUMBER 050912502 Civu. Rights 
pursuant to Utah rule of civil procedure 4(f) salomet 
9-02-05 Filed: Defendant State of UtahTs waiver of service of summons 
pursuant Utah rule of civil procedure 4(f) salomet 
9-02-05 Filed: Defendant State of Utah!s Waiver of service of summons 
pursuant Utah Rule of Civil prodedure 4(f). salomet 
9-02-05 Filed: Defendant Susan Eisenman's waiver of servcie of summons 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil procedure 4(f). salomet 
5-02-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 16.00 " teressah 
5-02-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 16.00 teressah 
5-06-05 Filed: Notice of Removal to Federal Court. salomet 
3-09-05 Filed: Waiver and Acceptance of Service wendyd 
3-09-05 Filed: Waiver and Acceptance of Service wendyd 
5-09-05 Filed: Waiver and Acceptance of Service wendyd 
5-09-05 Filed: Waiver and Acceptance of Service wendyd 
5-19-05 Case Disposition is Transferred chells 
Disposition Judge is LESLIE A LEWIS chells 
3-19-05 Note: Case sent to Federal Court chells 
inted: 09/29/05 08:51:38 Page 4 (last) 
05SCP-6 PH3.-34 
PEGGY E. STONE (6658) 
PETER L. ROGNLIE (4131) 
REED M. STRINGHAM (4679) 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant Richard Anderson 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
>Z$£ U/ E y 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER JENSEN, a minor, by and 
through his parents and natural guardians, 
BARBARA and DAREN JENSEN; 
BARBARA JENSEN, individually; and 
DAREN JENSEN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH; INTERMOUNTATN 
HEALTH CARE, INC.; KARI 
CUNNINGHAM, in her individual 
capacity; RICHARD ANDERSON, in his 
individual and official capacities; LARS M. 
WAGNER, in his individual capacity; 
DAVJD L. CORWTN, in his individual 
capacity; CHERYL M. COFFIN, in her 
individual capacity; KAREN H. 
ALBRITTON, in her individual capacity; 
SUSAN EISENMAN, in her individual * 
capacity; and JANE and JOHN DOE, in 
their individual capacities, 
NOTICE OF REMOVAL TO 
FEDERAL COURT 
Civil No. 050912502 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
Defendants. 
Please take notice that on the . day of September, 2005, defendant Richard 
Anderson, by and through his counsel, Peter L. Rognlie, Peggy E. Stone and Reed M. Stringham, 
Assistant Utah Attorneys General, filed a Notice of Removal of a Civil Action From State Court 
to Federal Court in the above-captioned case to the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah, Central Division. A copy of said Notice of Removal of a Civil Action From State Court 
to Federal Court is attached hereto. 
DATED this day of September, 2005. 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PEGGY E. STONE ~T 
PETER L. ROGNLIE 
REED M. STRINGHAM 
Assistant Utah Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Richard Anderson 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF REMOVAL 
TO FEDERAL COURT was sent by United States mail, postage prepaid, this day of 
September, 2005, to the following: 
Roger P. Christensen 
Karra J. Porter 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
David G. Williams 
10 Exchange Place, 11 Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Charles W. Dahlquist 
60 E. South Temple #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84070 
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